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Abstract (English) 
This thesis investigates the role of home ownership change insurance companies in relation to 
law firms‟ services within the niche of handling claims for home sellers. Based on a review of 
literature on disruptive innovation the thesis presents a study of cases in Oslo District Court 
and the Norwegian Courts of Appeal from the years 1993 until 2013. In addition available 
figures from the Norwegian insurance company Protector is presented. The sets of cases from 
the courts showed that from the Home Ownership Act was introduced in Norway in 1993 the 
number of cases increased gradually until 2000, while all sellers were represented by law 
firms. Then HOC insurance companies gradually displaced law firms during the years from 
2001 to 2013. The substitution process started out in the middle and lower segment of the 
market, while law firms have kept many of the clients with the most expensive houses. The 
introduction of HOC insurance in Norway was characterized by the entrance of several 
providers, and many of them quit the market before 2004 because of bad profitability and 
negative publicity. In 2013 only a few, but profitable HOC insurance companies were left. 
The analysis shows that the claims handling done by HOC insurance companies do not differ 
much from the work performed in law firms. The market around 1995 for law firms‟ services 
within this niche was around 50 MNOK and the market for HOC insurance in 2012 was 
around 800 MNOK, thus a 20 fold potential for both incumbents and entrants. This new 
market has been captured by a new industry, which has positioned itself between law firms 
and insurance companies. 
This thesis recommends future potential legal service providers to examine niches of legal 
work. Especially if there can be identified a segment of the market that has an unmet legal 
need in the lower end. The story of the Norwegian HOC insurance companies showed that the 
innovation itself were not unattainable to law firms. It was the business model that caused the 
problems. Existing law firms should watch innovations within legal niches, and claim their 
part of the new types of legal work that will be performed in the future. To have the greatest 
odds to succeed, they should choose the appropriate business model and organization within 
each niche. It is illustrating for the potential of legal innovation that the new market described 
in this thesis generates more revenue than the largest Norwegian law firm. Law firms should 
also be aware of thinking that the existence of the traditional way of competing means that 
disruption does not address them, or that the process of disruption stops at a certain percent of 
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the market. To make the theory of disruption more applicable on the legal and similar 
industries, more research should be done to understand which circumstances that affect the 
substitution process for this type of services. 
 
 
 
 
Abstract (Norwegian) 
Denne oppgaven tar for seg eierskifteforsikringen sin påvirkning på norske advokatfirmaer 
sitt marked for krav oppstått ved salg av bolig. Basert på en gjennomgang av litteratur om 
disruptiv innovasjon presenteres studier av saker ført ved Oslo Tingrett og de norske 
lagmannsrettene fra 1993 til 2013. Den inneholder også en sammenstilling av data om 
eierskifteforsikring fra forsikringsselskapet Protector sine årsrapporter. Dataene fra 
domstolene viser at fra avhendingsloven ble innført i 1993 og frem til 2000 økte antall saker, 
og alle sakene ble ført av tradisjonelle advokatfirmaer. I perioden fra 2001 til 2013 ble 
advokatfirmaene i en betydelig grad fortrengt av eierskifteforsikringsselskapene. Utviklingen 
skjedde raskest i det lavere og midtre sjiktet av markedet, mens advokatfirmaer klarte å holde 
på mange av klientene med de dyreste boligene frem mot 2012. Introduksjonen av 
eierskifteforsikring i Norge var preget av mange nykommere som forsøkte å etablere seg med 
denne typen forsikring, men flere av dem kuttet ut produktet på grunn av dårlig lønnsomhet 
og negativ omtale i pressen. I 2013 var det kun noen få aktører igjen, men disse var til 
gjengjeld lønnsomme. Analysen viser at eierskifteforsikringsselskapenes skadesaksbehandling 
ikke skiller seg vesentlig fra jobben som ville blitt gjort i et tradisjonelt advokatfirma. Rundt 
1995 var det et estimert marked på ca 50 MNOK, mens markedet i 2012 er estimert til 
omtrent 800 MNOK. Dette markedet har i stor grad tilfalt eierskifteforsikringsselskapene, 
som har posisjonert seg mellom advokatfirmaer og forsikringsselskaper.   
Innovative juridiske tjenestetilbydere anbefales å fokusere på nisjer innenfor juridiske 
tjenester. Det antas at det er størst potensial der det finnes et latent udekket marked, noe som 
ofte finnes i det nedre sjiktet av det eksisterende markedet. Historien om de norske 
eierskifteforsikringsselskapene viste at innovasjonen i seg selv ikke adskilte seg i stor grad fra 
tradisjonell advokatvirksomhet, men at det var forretningsmodellen som gjorde at det nye 
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markedet ikke kom advokatfirmaene til gode. Eksisterende advokatfirmaer kan følge med på 
innovasjoner innenfor eksisterende og nye saksområder, og har muligheten til å ta en del av 
det juridiske arbeidet som vil bli utført der i fremtiden. For å ha størst mulig sjanse til å lykkes 
med dette bør de legge arbeid i utformingen av forretningsmodell og organisasjon innenfor 
hvert enkelt saksfelt, fremfor å forsøke å tilpasse nye saksområder til sin eksisterende 
organisasjonsstruktur. Det er illustrerende for potensialet til en slik tankegang at omsetningen 
for eierskifteforsikringer i dag er større enn omsetningen til det største norske advokatfirmaet. 
Eksisterende advokatfirmaer bør også være forsiktige med å tenke at eksistensen av 
tradisjonelle advokatfirmaer beviser at disruptiv innovasjonsteori ikke er relevant, eller at 
substitusjonsprosessen vil stoppe ved en viss markedsandel. For å gjøre disruptiv 
innovasjonteori mer anvendelig for juridisk tjenesteyting og lignende tjenester, bør det gjøres 
mer forskning for å forstå hvilke omstendigheter som påvirker subtitusjonsprosessen for 
denne type tjenester. Dette er kunnskap som eksisterende firmaer og bransjeorganisasjoner 
ville kunne ha god nytte av. 
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1 Introduction 
 
In this thesis I will explain the growth and development of the Norwegian market for home 
ownership change (HOC) insurance and its impact on the market for legal services, through 
the lens of disruptive innovation. HOC insurance is an insurance against potential claims from 
the buyer of a property. This type of insurance was introduced as a new product in Norway 
around 1996/97 and is today sold to around 80% of home sellers. The research questions are 
“Is home ownership change insurance disruptive to law firms within the field of home 
ownership change claims” and “If disruptive, how fast has the disruption happened within this 
field.” This is examined through an archival analysis of Norwegian legal records of HOC 
cases from 1993 until 2013. In addition I have gathered figures from HOC insurance 
companies. The resulting data can indicate whether the HOC insurance companies have taken 
work from law firms and/or if they are serving a new market. In addition to start out by taking 
the lowest-margin work from existing firms, a disruptive innovation typically is simpler and 
more convenient accessible than the old product. As proposed in the title of the thesis HOC 
insurance can be a new-market disruptive innovation, which means that it first directs a type 
of consumers that did not use the old version of the product (in this case law firms). The thesis 
will also give a description of the evolution of a market for HOC insurance in Norway. If the 
theory of disruptive innovation explains what happened here, this could also help explaining 
why some of the entrants in this market failed and why others succeeded.  
In the early days of this industry in Norway some early entrants, which were large 
international and Norwegian insurance companies, tried, but did not succeed with their 
attempts of selling this type of insurance profitably and quit the market before it took off. The 
actors that remained were smaller, more specialized providers of insurance products. After 
that the market for HOC insurance took off, Norwegian insurance companies have introduced 
similar insurance schemes within other legal areas. Contributions to understand the 
development within home ownership insurance could therefore be useful when analyzing 
similar insurance schemes and other services or business models, possibly disruptive to other 
legal fields of practice. 
Innovation and industry change have for a long time been valued areas of knowledge for both 
practitioners and researchers. Businesses that launch new products and services, thereby 
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imposing change, can improve their position in relation to competitors or enter markets with 
none or only a few competitors. If consumers embrace the change this will normally be 
reflected in the business‟ revenue. Innovation is also considered beneficial for consumers and 
the society as a whole, as it is bringing forward technical and social improvements. 
Schumpeter (1934) remarked the role small, entrepreneurial firms had in the economy when it 
came to the introduction of new products and technologies. Later he observed that large 
established firms with greater power had advantages over small firms and new entrants, for 
example skills, capital and monopoly power (Schumpeter, 1942). Regarding innovation 
Schumpeter (1942) addressed the dynamics of economics and capitalism and came up with 
the term creative destruction for the never ending process of renewal in the capitalistic 
system. Radical versus incremental innovation was an early and popular categorization that 
formed the discussion on technological change. Other categorizations were competency-
enhancing and competency-destroying technological changes (Tushman & Anderson, 1986) 
and modular versus architectural innovations (Henderson & Clark, 1990). Modular and 
architectural innovations are respectively innovations in the core of one of the modules of the 
product, or in the links between the modules. 
As a response to anomalies to the work of Henderson and Clark (1990) Christensen (1997) 
introduced the distinction disruptive versus sustaining innovation. After first being framed as 
a technological phenomenon called disruptive technology, it was later reframed as disruptive 
innovation, as changes in the business model was considered being the most crucial element 
of the theory (Christensen & Raynor, 2003). Disruptive innovation theory has shown to have 
severe implications for businesses facing disruptive innovations and entrants exploiting them.  
Disruptive innovation theory has been applied on a wide range of industries and public 
services, for example educational- and health services. Christensen, Horn, and Johnson (2008) 
question the existing model for educating students in batches in a standardized way. They 
suggest that we will see 50% computer-based learning by 2020. Christensen, Grossmann, and 
Hwang (2009) address some of the main problems facing health care in the US. Disruptive 
innovation in the health sector is anticipated to follow a pattern where existing services 
offered in hospitals migrate to outpatient clinics, then doctors‟ offices and then patients‟ 
homes. While innovation in today‟s hospitals is sustaining in character, the other steps 
described will be of disruptive character for the hospitals. Lately Christensen has also 
proposed the legal and the consulting industry as industries where disruptive forces are 
present (Christensen, Wang, & van Bever, 2013). In the legal sector disruption is seen coming 
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from customers‟ in-house legal counsels, new legal providers and disruptive business models 
made possible by new technology. One of the most known futurists in the legal field, Richard 
Susskind (2010, 2013), promotes the technological possibilities of information technology, 
commoditization, outsourcing, external investment etc.  
The motivation for this thesis is to try to position one legal field of practice in the landscape 
of disruptive innovation as done by other scholars in industries as steel manufacturing, 
semiconductor manufacturing, education and health care. The legal industry has long been 
proposed as facing disruption, but due to the intangibility and opacity of legal work and 
markets, it is difficult to quantify the impact this have had and potentially will have on the 
industry. Therefore it is also a motivation to give the insiders of the industry and the broader 
business community one clear example of how a shift in the legal industry, leaving law firms 
redundant, has happened. If the conclusion is that the disruptive framework cannot contribute 
to explain these industry-changes, it will also be a valuable result, being an anomaly, which 
might help to further improve the theory of disruptive innovation. 
Through an earlier project thesis on the legal industry I explored the trends and forces in the 
legal industry in Norway. This led me to the insurance industry, and the growth in sales of 
home ownership insurance the last two decades. Intuitively it looked as these, often small, 
insurance companies to some extent had displaced the need for law firms and traditional legal 
services. This could be observed in the legal records of such cases where several claims were 
undertaken by insurance companies, and not by the house-sellers or their lawyers themselves. 
Some of these insurance companies used their own staff to litigate these cases, thereby 
leaving law firms redundant. 
The thesis consists of three main parts; literature review, research methodology, and results 
and discussion. As this study mainly directs and tests the applicability of the disruptive 
innovation framework on home ownership insurance the theory part gives a complementary 
description of the theory of disruptive innovation. As the definition and scope of disruptive 
innovation are still heavily discussed by strategy scholars this part also includes the discussion 
and criticism that has evolved after the theory was proposed by Clayton Christensen in 1995. 
The research methodology part gives an overview and discussion of the study design. It will 
also describe and discuss the way the data was collected. The result part will present and 
analyze the collected data, the results and time-series. The results will be graphically 
presented to give a visual impression of the development, in the same way that the 
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development of disruptive innovations normally is presented. The last part of the thesis will 
be a conclusion and a discussion of the implications for scholars and practitioners. 
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2 Literature review 
2.1 Disruptive innovations 
The concept of disruptive innovation was first explored by Clayton Christensen and Joseph 
Bower in their article “Disruptive Technologies; Catching the Wave” (Bower & Christensen, 
1995). They described the phenomenon as new, inferior technologies that disrupt established 
technologies. Later the theory was further explained in the book The Innovator‟s Dilemma 
(Christensen, 1997). Christensen‟s work was based on studies of the excavator- and disk-
drive-industries, both of which went through severe transformation during several decades. 
Later the theory was developed to include services and business models, and the term 
disruptive innovation was found better to describe the phenomenon (Christensen & Raynor, 
2003). The term “disruptive” has also been found unfortunate by Christensen, as it has several 
connotations and promotes different associations with people. In English it can for example 
mean “failure” or “radical” in addition to Christensen‟s definition (Christensen, 2006, p. 42). 
Christensen remarks that this might be why some regard the phenomenon as defined post-hoc. 
An alternative name came from Grove (1998), that suggested that the phenomenon should be 
called the “Christensen Effect”. Regardless of this the term disruptive is now established 
within management theory, leaving the further development of the definition to the theory 
builders, even though it is still interpreted in many directions outside (and sometimes inside) 
academia. 
The discussion about different categories of innovations, different competitive effects and the 
characteristics of innovative organizations has been heavily discussed since Schumpeter 
(1934, 1942). Before disruptive innovation theory the innovation literature to a great extent 
was concentrated on discussing different categorizations of innovation. Whenever an anomaly 
has been found in the old categories, new ones have been proposed. To a greater extent than 
previous scholars examining innovation Christensen (1997) focused on building a normative 
theory (Christensen, 2006). Through examining the anomalous instances to his categories, for 
example incumbent leaders that succeeded with disruptive technologies, he proposed building 
a predictive theory to help managers facing certain situations, and in given circumstances to 
predict which actions that would lead to the desired results. Through this he was able to 
reframe the problem and proposed that managing innovation was not a technology problem; it 
was a business model problem (Christensen, 2006).  
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Intuitively Schumpeter‟s (1942) well known notion of creative destruction may remind of 
disruptive innovation, or that disruption is the mechanism behind destruction or vice versa. 
While Schumpeter briefly described the phenomenon that new businesses replace old ones, 
Christensen went further and was able to state a circumstance based theory to help managers 
predict certain effects.  
The distinction between small incremental improvements and significant new concepts has 
been an important part of the innovation literature (Mansfield, 1968; Moch & Morse, 1977). 
Incremental innovations imply only small changes to existing products or design. The 
literature was also built on observations that this category of innovations often reinforced the 
dominance of established firms (Henderson & Clark, 1990; Tushman & Anderson, 1986). 
Radical innovations are based on different sets of engineering and science and often opens up 
for new applications and markets. Radical innovation has been found to often create big 
difficulties for established firms (Henderson & Clark, 1990; Tushman & Anderson, 1986). 
Henderson and Clark (1990) even stated that this type of innovation could be the base for the 
successful entry of new firms or even the redefinition of an industry. On the other hand they 
had observed growing evidence of technological innovations that involved small changes to 
existing technology, but with dramatic competitive consequences (Henderson & Clark, 1990). 
Tushman and Anderson (1986) observed, much like previous scholars, that technology 
evolves through long periods of incremental change punctuated by rare innovations that 
radically improve the state of the art. They also found that such discontinuities are not all 
alike. Competency-enhancing discontinuities build on and permit the usage of existing know-
how. Competency-destroying discontinuities are built on knowledge, skills and competence 
that are inconsistable with prior knowledge (Tushman & Anderson, 1986). Technological 
discontinuities, both competency-enhancing and -destroying also are found to represent 
opportunities for competitive advantage. Firms that do not early adopt the discontinuous 
technology risk are failing because the product-class conditions change so dramatically after 
the discontinuity (Tushman & Anderson, 1986). 
Henderson and Clark (1990) proposed a model that explains how minor innovations can have 
great competitive consequences. They built a model on the distinction between the product in 
its parts, the components, and the product as a whole. A certain integration or linkage of 
components is defined as the product “architecture”, and innovations that change the 
architecture of a product without changing its components are architectural innovations. 
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Architectural innovations, sometimes seemingly minor, can give established organizations 
challenges that may have great competitive implications. Architectural innovations as defined 
by Henderson and Clark (1990) destroy the usefulness of the architectural knowledge of 
established firms, and since architectural knowledge tends to become embedded in the 
structure of established organizations, the phenomenon is difficult for firms to recognize.  
(Henderson & Clark, 1990). Relating to the framework of Tushman and Anderson (1986)  
Henderson and Clark find their new categories as a necessary for a deeper understanding  
“since the essence of architectural innovation is that it both enhances and destroys 
competence, often in subtle ways” (Henderson & Clark, 1990, p. 28). 
Christensen‟s work on disruptive innovation was initiated by anomalies he had observed in 
the disk-drive industry, that could not be explained by Henderson and Clark (1990) and their 
work on modular versus architectural innovations (Christensen, 2006). While Henderson 
suggested that architectural innovation would give competitive advantages, Christensen 
(1993) observed that most of the integrated firms that established the disk-drive industry were 
driven away from it, as they found it “difficult to protect or retain valuable modular and 
architectural technologies that their customers didn‟t want” (Christensen, 1993, p. 584). They 
were displaced by networks of focused, less integrated and independent companies using the 
same technologies. Since some companies failed and some succeeded with the same 
technologies, it had to be other reasons than only the one suggested by Henderson and Clark. 
Christensen had also observed anomalies regarding the model of Tushman and Anderson 
(1986): “Observations was made that established firms, though often at great cost, have led 
their industries in developing critical competence-destroying technologies, when the new 
technology was needed to meet existing customers‟ demands” (Christensen & Bower, 1996, 
p. 199). 
The disk-drive industry had also gone through 5-6 shifts of technology within a short time-
span, which made it perfect for an analysis of the technological impact on industry change. 
Christensen (1997) showed how new technologies, developed by entrants to the industry, got 
a hold with the least demanding customers and then gradually worked their way up-market 
pushing the incumbents the same way. In the end only few of the incumbents survived in the 
changed marketplace. Even though disruptive technologies initially underperform established 
ones in serving the mainstream market, they eventually displace the established technologies. 
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Firms with disruptive innovations displace incumbent firms that supported the old technology. 
The logic behind these observations is that in each market there exists a rate of improvement 
that customers can absorb or utilize. Christensen observed that the rate of improvement of 
sustaining innovations often would follow a steeper trajectory than what customers needed 
(Christensen, 1997). This led to products that were more sophisticated and with more 
functions than most customers could use. The reason this happens is that companies strive to 
make better products that they can sell for higher profit margins to customers in more 
demanding tiers of the market. When similar products based on new technologies emerged 
they were often not good enough to compete with most of the customers of the incumbent 
companies. But since many customers were over-served, some of them would consider 
simpler and cheaper products, like the ones based on new technologies. These would have 
lower performance than existing products, but would be cheaper and more convenient 
accessible. As the new products improved they would become good enough for more and 
more customers.  
 
 
Figure 1. The impact of sustaining and disruptive technology (Christensen, 1997, p. xvi). 
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The criteria for distinguishing between disruptive and sustaining technologies are not clear, 
and are still discussed in the literature. Christensen‟s criteria are that the innovation doesn‟t 
try to bring better products to established customers in existing markets. A disruptive 
innovation disrupts and redefines the performance trajectory by introducing products and 
services that are not as good as currently available products. Disruptive innovations offer 
other benefits, they typically are simpler, more convenient, and less expensive products that 
appeal to new or less-demanding customers (Christensen & Raynor, 2003). 
Later Christensen introduced a third dimension to the disruption diagram, which included new 
customers and new contexts for consumption (Christensen & Raynor, 2003). This led to the 
definition of another type of disruptive innovation; new-market disruptive innovations. New-
market disruptions compete with what Christensen calls “nonconsumption”. The products that 
are new-market disruptive are so simple and affordable that they will attract a new type of 
customers to use the product. Typically the users have not owned or used the prior generation 
of products and services. The challenge for new-market disruptors is to create a new value 
network, where it is non-consumption, not the incumbent, that must be overcome (Christensen 
& Raynor, 2003). As the performance of new-market disruptive innovations improve they 
ultimately become good enough to pull customers out of the original value network into the 
new one, starting with the least-demanding tier (Christensen & Raynor, 2003). Thus they do 
not invade the mainstream market, but pulls customers out of the mainstream value network 
because these customers find it more convenient to use the new product. 
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Figure 2. New-market disruption (Christensen & Raynor, 2003).  
 
Danneels (2004) highlights the complexity of Christensen‟s argument of disruptive theory, 
and the simplifying it is often a subject to. He argues that the term has come to be loosely 
used and separated from its theoretical basis. Danneels defines a disruptive technology as a 
technology that changes the base of competition by changing the performance metrics along 
which firms compete. 
Christensen has together with industry-insiders publicized books on how disrupting 
innovation can be applied and explain changes in the educational- and health sector. In 
“Disrupting Class” Christensen et al. (2008) evaluate the existing model for educating 
students in batches and in an standardized way. Schools are hired by society to perform four 
distinct jobs; Preserve democracy, provide something for every student, keep the country 
competitive and eliminate poverty. A part of the solution can be student-centric learning, 
online educational software tailoring instruction to each individual student. The pace of 
substitution of computer-based learning for monolithic learning is calculated and extrapolated 
into the coming years suggesting 50% computer-based learning in 2020. The substitution is 
explained because of the technological and economic advantages of computer-based learning, 
compared to the monolithic school model.  
11 
 
Disruptive innovation has also been applied to health services. With “The Innovator‟s 
Prescription” Christensen et al. (2009) addresses some of the main problems facing health 
care in the US. The hospital business model has been quite stable for a long time, even though 
content and technology has changed. The organization of hospitals is what makes them so 
costly, made for intuitive medicine. Disruptive innovation in the health sector is anticipated to 
follow a pattern where existing services made in hospitals go to outpatient clinics, then 
doctors‟ offices and then patients‟ homes. While innovation in today‟s hospitals will be 
sustaining in character, the other steps described will be of disruptive character for the 
hospitals. Christensen has also proposed the legal and the consulting industry as industries 
facing disruptive changes (Christensen et al., 2013).  
While the early discussion on innovation was concentrated on technology and physical 
products, it was natural that Christensen (1997) to continue on this track. When realizing that 
the innovation was not necessarily inherent in the technology it led to a widening and more 
generally applicable theory. This made possible that the disruptive innovation theory could be 
applied on whole industries and not-technological industries. Earlier frameworks were more 
difficult applicable on service industries, like legal services. Today disruptive innovation 
theory appears as a better tool to handle these industries, also compared to competing 
frameworks.  
Although not much examined in the academic literature, there has been a certain development 
within legal services. Within law firms little has happened with the way legal services are 
performed, the traditional law firm pyramid is still the dominating model of delivering legal 
services. Outside law firms the situation has changed the last decades. According to economic 
theory legal services are not core competences of corporations and should therefore be 
outsourced. Conversely to this the traditional legal model has turned economic theories upside 
down, causing corporations to in-source half of their legal work (Christensen & Anthony, 
2004). Today general counsel budgets account for about one-third of the legal market in 
America (Christensen et al., 2013). Also in Norway we have seen that big corporations are 
building their own legal departments, in-sourcing some of the work previously done by law-
firms. On the consumer side, non-law firms, has taken the lead in the development of new 
legal services as legal insurances (eg. HOC insurance), specialized consultancies, 
procurement services etc. A further flight from away from the delivery of legal advice on a 
customized basis is expected (Christensen et al., 2013; Faure, 2012; Susskind, 2010, 2013).  
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2.2 Categorization based on characteristics of the innovation itself  
Disruptive innovation has by some been perceived as a technology phenomenon, while others 
have extended the theory to also be valid for services, products and business models. 
Christensen first proposed to use the term disruptive technologies (Bower & Christensen, 
1995), but later put everything under the label disruptive innovation (Christensen & Raynor, 
2003). Christensen (2006) explains that as he used his theory to explain the success and 
failure of companies in the semiconductor and computer industries, he encountered anomalies 
to the theory of disruptive technology. The anomalies were incumbent leaders in their 
industries that had succeeded at disruption. In each of these anomalous instances, the leader 
had been setting up an autonomous business unit, and permitted that it pursued a very 
different business model than the main organization, a business model that freely could be 
formed to suit the needs of the situation. Christensen concludes that “it was a business model 
problem. I made a mistake when I labeled the phenomenon as a disruptive technology; the 
disruptive business model in which the technology is deployed paralyzes the incumbent 
leaders” (Christensen, 2006, p. 43).  
Other scholars have gone in another direction than Christensen, explicitly categorizing 
different forms of disruptive innovations. Markides (2006) states that different kinds of 
disruptive innovations have different competitive effects and produce different kinds of 
markets. He mentions three distinct types of disruptive innovations. First disruptive 
technology as presented by Christensen (1997). Then Markides presents and discusses two 
other types of disruptive innovations: Disruptive business-model innovations (he prefer to call 
them strategic innovations) and disruptive radical product innovations. He demonstrates that 
they pose radically different challenges for established firms and have radically different 
implications for managers. He proposes that technological innovations, business-model 
innovations and new to the world product innovations (radical product innovations) should be 
treated as distinct phenomena and that this is necessary for further development of the theory.  
In earlier works Markides has called business-model innovation strategic innovation. He 
defines business-model innovation as “the discovery of a fundamentally different business 
model in an existing business” (Markides, 2006, p. 20). An example is that Amazon and 
Barnes & Noble compete in the book retail business in fundamentally different ways. 
Markides demands that the business model must enlarge the existing economic pie, indicating 
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that a business model innovation is something more than just a new strategy. Since the 
entrants‟ products emphasize other dimensions of the product or service than the incumbents, 
the new markets consist of different customers, and different key success factors. This makes 
it necessary with new activities, which often are incompatible with the incumbents‟ activity-
system (Markides, 2006). This implies that it will be difficult to compete in both markets, 
typically that one becomes stuck in the middle if one tries to compete with both low-cost and 
differentiation strategies (Porter, 1980). 
Christensen (2006) counters Markides‟ critique by underlining that expressing it in the terms 
of disruptive business models is an important improvement to the theory. Through an example 
of the wireless telephony industry Christensen illustrates that the technology could be 
disruptive to another technology, but without having a disruptive profit model. This led to that 
the established businesses in landline telephony could stay atop wireless telephony. 
According to Christensen it is not the technology that gives incumbents problems, it is the 
business model.  This is why Christensen since Christensen and Raynor (2003) consequently 
has used the term disruptive innovation. 
Markides (2006) defines radical product innovation as radical innovation that creates new-to-
the-world products. He mentions the car, television, personal computers, VCRs, or mobile 
phones as examples of this. Radical product innovations tend to be disruptive to established 
competitors. A radical product innovation is disruptive to consumers because they introduce 
products and value propositions that disturb prevailing consumer habits and behaviors in a 
major way. They are disruptive to producers because the markets they create undermine the 
competences and complementary assets on which existing competitors have built their success 
(Markides, 2006). 
According to Markides innovations that are disruptive to both consumers and producers are 
driven by a supply-push process and not by demand. Because of this they share certain 
characteristics: 1) New markets are invaded by hordes of new entrants, well before the new 
market starts growing. 2) High product variety in the young market. 3) This is followed by a 
sharp, sudden and sizeable shakeout. This is associated with the emergence of a dominant 
design in the market, which signals coming growth. This process takes a long time to unfold. 
Christensen (2006) acknowledges that there are “new to the world” innovations, and that he 
has not carefully considered these before. On the other hand Christensen refuses that many of 
the innovations that Markides mentions really are new to the world. “Using the concept of 
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relativity should help us. Where an innovation cannot be described relative to a preexisting 
product or technology, we can say it indeed was new to the world” (Christensen, 2006, p. 48). 
Since disruptive innovation theory is built on the concept of relativity, it cannot explain the 
types of innovations proposed by Markides, but according to Christensen these do not occur 
very often. This also questions whether this type of innovation can, or should, be framed as a 
disruptive innovation at all. 
Although several scholars still refer to the phenomenon as disruptive technology, it seems like 
today most of the literature accepts Christensen‟s definition of disruptive innovation as a 
business-model phenomenon. On the other hand Markides‟ contribution may contain valuable 
hints suitable for further exploration. Especially the observations of co-existence with 
incumbent firms and the shakeout of early entrants offering innovations that have shown to 
have disruptive characteristics are interesting.  Even a difference in the pace of disruption 
between groups of innovations would justify a closer categorization of different types of 
disruptive innovation. 
HOC insurance does not include any new technology. It could be defined as a new product, a 
new insurance product, or simply a new business model. HOC insurance in Norway is sold 
through a different business model than both legal services and ordinary insurance policies, 
even though it is more normal today to buy insurance when you buy a product for example. 
In relation to law firms disruption would be within one segment of the industry; the segment 
of home sales. But, of course, in a larger perspective, one could say that legal insurances in 
general could potentially be disruptive to law firms. In general HOC insurance could also be 
interpreted as a radical product innovation, given that the definition is not too strict, because 
insurance in itself is not really a physical product, but HOC insurance was a new product in 
Norway. Some established insurance companies offered HOC insurance through their normal 
business model, but quit after being unsuccessful in making a profit. 
 
2.3 Categorization based on where the disruptive innovation gains a 
foothold 
Disruptive innovation has for many been synonymous with an innovation that starts out at the 
bottom of a given market, and then eats itself up-market to finally wipe out the incumbent 
competitors (low-end disruption). The literature has later acknowledged what is known as 
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new-market disruptions (Christensen & Raynor, 2003), while high-end disruptions 
(Govindarajan & Kopalle, 2006) have not gained the same acceptance. 
Christensen (1997) presented what is now known as low-end disruption. This process begins, 
or takes a foothold, in the low end of an existing market. Known examples of low-end 
disruption are steel mini-mills and discount retailing. They start by picking out the least 
attractive customers in the existing market, and then work their way up-market, pushing the 
incumbents into higher and higher margin customers, ultimately pushing them out of the 
market. Thus they do not invade the mainstream market, but pulls customers out of the 
mainstream value network because these customers find it more convenient to use the new 
product. Because of this the incumbent leaders feel little threat until the disruption has come 
far. This is when the incumbents according to Christensen (1997) will migrate up-market, and 
for a time enjoying higher margins. A new-market disruptive innovation first gains a foothold 
among users that have not owned or used the prior generation of products and services 
(Christensen & Raynor, 2003). 
Schmidt and Druehl (2008) introduce two types of new-market disruptions: Fringe market and 
detached market. New market disruptions of the fringe market type initially sells to customers 
at the low-end fringe of the existing market. When the performance and cost improves the 
new product is more attractive to all customers and particularly high-end customers. New-
market disruptions of the detached type initially sell to a market that is detached from the 
market for the old product. As a consequence of this, that the old and new product sell to 
opposite ends of the market, new market disruptions of the detached type can initially be high 
priced. As the quality improves and the cost decreases the new product would start look better 
to users of the old product, and the two ends of the markets will eventually merge while 
disruption occurs. Govindarajan and Kopalle (2006) Govindarajan and Kopalle (2006) 
Govindarajan and Kopalle (2006) Govindarajan and Kopalle (2006) Govindarajan and 
Kopalle (2006) Govindarajan and Kopalle (2006) criticize Christensen‟s narrow definition of 
disruptiveness, and they propose that disruptive innovations can be high-end as well. That 
means technologically more radical in nature in contrast to low-end disruptions which would 
be less radical. The disruptiveness construct is different from the radicalness dimension 
(radical vs. incremental). The disruptiveness construct is a market-based dimension, while the 
radicalness is a technology-based dimension. Govindarajan and Kopalle (2006) propose that 
high end disruptions create a dilemma for incumbents for the same reasons as low-end 
disruptions. They conclude that disruptive innovations can involve either radical technologies 
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(high end) or incremental technologies (low end). Thus they propose a more general 
definition of disruptive innovations:   
A disruptive innovation introduces a different set of features, performance, and 
price attributes relative to the existing product, an unattractive combination for 
mainstream customers at the time of product introduction because of inferior 
performance on the attributes these customers value and/or a high price – 
although a different customer segment may value the new attributes. Subsequent 
developments over time, however, raise the new product’s attributes to a level 
sufficient to satisfy mainstream customers, thus attracting more of the mainstream 
market.(Govindarajan & Kopalle, 2006) 
Christensen (2006) resists calling all of these phenomena disruptions. He argues that he is 
trying to give specific meaning to the term, independent of the outcome. He argues that 
“another mechanism of action causes the leaders to have missed these high-end innovations, 
and we should find another name for it” (Christensen, 2006, p. 50).  
We see that Christensen reserves the term disruption for innovations that is difficult for the 
incumbents to adopt, because of organizational competencies. High-end disruptions cannot be 
defined ex-ante, and the theory will therefore have to be built post-hoc. Christensen (2006) 
proposes that the observed phenomenon, an anomaly to disruptive theory, might become a 
future third category of innovations in addition to sustaining and disruptive innovations. A 
category that similar to disruptive innovations has the effect of leaving the leader flat-footed, 
unable to respond effectively. This category would be “innovations that are unattainable to the 
incumbent leaders, because the technology or capital requirements are simply beyond the 
reach of the incumbent leaders” (Christensen, 2006, p. 51). The discussion of low-end, new-
market, high-end or other categories of disruptive innovations is useful both to recognize and 
adapt to disruptivity, but also to sort out observations that is not disruptive innovations. 
HOC insurance has the potential to be a new-market disruption. Insurances are sold before an 
incident happens, while law firms normally sell its services after the incident has happened. 
This means that a new market at least would consist of a portion of home sellers with 
insurance, but without a claim. Also one would anticipate some home sellers that not before 
would have considered using a law firm, due to price and availability. They would neither 
have used another type of insurance as there was not a consumer insurance scheme with the 
same coverage. Of course it would have been possible to buy insurance, as insurance 
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companies practically can insure everything, but the availability and price of such a service 
simply didn‟t fit consumers‟ needs. In Christensen‟s words this group of consumers had never 
used the prior generations of the product before. To elaborate on the propositions from 
Schmidt and Druehl (2008) the fact that HOC insurance was initially not very low priced and 
that it looked like a traditional insurance product may indicate a new-market disruption of the 
detached type, which initially sold to another end of the market than law firms. 
 
2.4 The mechanism of failure 
Industry changes resulting from disruptive innovations do not necessarily come much 
unexpected or quickly. The problem for the incumbents is that the same factors that made 
them successful actually prevent them from adapting to disruptive change (Christensen, 
1997). Christensen suggests the resource allocation process in big firms, which effectively 
cuts projects with too small revenue potential, as an explanation. As potential disruptive 
innovations do not yet have a defined market, traditional revenue projections cannot be done. 
These decisions will typically be done by the middle-managers, without top managements 
awareness of potential disruptive innovations promoted further down in the organization. 
(Christensen & Raynor, 2003) 
Danneels (2004) asks why some incumbents succeed. Contrary to Christensen Danneels 
(2004) believes “that individual managerial competence does play a significant role and 
should be an explicit focus of research into the determinants of incumbent success. Some 
managers do seem able to lead their firms across technological transitions” (Danneels, 2004). 
He concludes that “it seems that many, but not all, incumbents fail in the face of disruptive 
technology (Danneels, 2004, p. 252). He addresses this question for further investigation. He 
proposes that the same explanations that Christensen (Christensen, 1997; Christensen & 
Raynor, 2003) suggests for incumbent failure may also be the explanation for the incumbents 
that succeed. This is the resource allocation process; and organizational resources, processes, 
and values (the „„RPV‟‟ framework) (Christensen & Raynor, 2003). What the incumbents 
were missing was a marketing competence, the ability of a firm to build new customer 
competences, i.e., to identify and build relationships with customers it has not served yet 
(Danneels, 2002). 
Henderson (2006) criticizes Christensen‟s narrow focus on cognitive failures in the senior 
team to explain the firms‟ failures to meet with disruptive innovation. Earlier research of 
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failing incumbents was focused on the supply side, for example competence-destroying 
innovations, but also on the marketplace. While Christensen (1997) does not address 
organizational competence, Henderson (2006) suggests that organizational competence is 
much more central to established firm failure in the face of disruptive innovation. She argues 
that embedded customer and market-related competencies have a critical role in meeting with 
disruptive innovations. She recommends increased focus on market-related competences. 
Christensen (2006) acknowledges Henderson‟s contribution to the theory, and nuances her 
view on customers‟ role. Addressing customers‟ role he clarifies that managers always must 
listen to customers, but that they have to be aware of where their (best) customers will lead 
them: 
A customer will rarely lead its supplier to develop products that the customer 
cannot use. The right lead customers for sustaining innovations are different from 
those for disruptive innovations. And the lead users for new-market innovations 
may not yet be users. (Christensen, 2006, p. 51) 
The explanation of rational or irrational capture by existing margins that Christensen (1997) 
provides for disruptive innovations seems logic at least for low-end disruptions. Henderson 
(2006) introduces a different explanation for the failure of established companies facing new-
market disruptions. On the dominant scale of performance it seems unlikely that new market 
disruptions will ever perform as the products of established companies. In addition to this 
Henderson points at the migration that happens when customers flee from the incumbent‟s 
value network to the new value network. Through an example of the nutritional energy bar 
market, she sees it as unlikely that these products have improved so much on the existing 
performance scale, but that it is more likely that customer preferences may have shifted. This 
is a characteristic she sees with many disruptive innovations: “They come to reshape the 
pattern of preferences in a market, and this is particularly difficult for established firms to 
respond to effectively for reasons that flow directly from the nature of the embedded 
organizational competencies of the firm. (Henderson, 2006, p. 9)” This is what Henderson 
introduces as the “new-market innovator‟s dilemma”. 
In addition to contributing to the understanding of how difficult it can be for established firms 
to respond to significant shifts in the environment Henderson (2006) suggests that it 
highlights the role of market-facing competence in shaping a firm‟s response to disruptive 
innovation. Christensen (2006) acknowledges Henderson‟s contribution to improve the theory 
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of new-market disruptions. According to Christensen the logic behind market-facing 
competence in regard to new-market disruptions is that one does not necessarily know the 
future customers or lead users yet. 
Christensen (1997) and Markides (2006) agree upon that established companies find most of 
disruptive innovations unattractive. While Christensen argues that this is because of 
management failure, Markides argues that most of these business-model innovations simply 
do not make economic sense for established companies. Yu and Hang (2010) review the 
literature on this field from four main perspectives from the attempt of the previous literature 
to explain the failure of incumbents and the market success of seemingly inferior 
technologies. The perspectives are 1) the internal perspective 2) the external perspective 3) 
the marketing and customer orientation perspective and 4) the technology perspective. 
Perspective 1 is the one favored by Christensen, focusing on management failure and existing 
business model biases in the resource allocation process, such as the key evaluation factor for 
financial returns (Christensen, 2006). Other scholars have examined perspective 3 and argued 
for developing market-related competencies. Perspective 2 and 4 have to a little degree been 
examined in academia. Yu and Hang (2010) observe that the literature is quite unbalanced in 
favor of perspective 1 and 3. Building on the existing literature Yu and Hang (2010) 
underscore the importance of finding the emerging market and deeply understanding the 
customers‟ latent needs, because a firm‟s disabilities in finding new markets for new 
technologies may be its most serious innovation handicap (Christensen & Bower, 1996). 
Established insurance companies are hierarchical organizations with much sales staff. If 
someone in such an organization should have proposed selling HOC insurances it seems 
likely that this initiative could be stopped at a step in the resource allocation process. The 
HOC insurance was not sold through the established sales channels; it could not be sold in the 
same situations that for example home, travel or life-insurance, but only in a specific situation 
when a customer was selling a house. When we know that some of the established insurance 
companies in Norway tried offering HOC insurance Christensen‟s explanation of 
management failure may be a potential explanation of why they left the market before it took 
off. This assumes that HOC insurance is a disruptive innovation (disruptive business model) 
to insurance companies. 
Through Hendersons logic and assuming that HOC insurance is a new-market disruption in 
relation to law firms, it seems logic that home sellers‟ preferences over time may have shifted 
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from buying legal services from an expensive law firm ex-post (when the claim is received) to 
buying a (cheap) insurance ex-ante (before the home seller know if a claim will be received). 
 
2.5 Relativity of disruption 
Disruptive innovation is a relative term, which means that disruptiveness can only be 
measured relative to the business model of another firm. This means that  an innovation that is 
disruptive to one business can be sustaining to another business (Christensen, 2006; 
Christensen & Raynor, 2003). It also means that an innovation that cannot be measured 
relative to any other business does not fit within the disruptive innovation framework as 
formulated by Christensen. As mentioned above this is referred to by Markides (2006) as a 
“new to the world” radical product innovation, and he categorizes it as a special type of 
disruptive innovation, while Christensen (2006) categorizes it as a new third type of 
innovation, in addition to sustaining and disruptive innovation. According to Christensen you 
should not challenge established companies if your product is not disruptive relative to all the 
established players in the targeted market (Christensen & Raynor, 2003). He generally views 
it as difficult to win a fight against an established incumbent with a sustaining innovation.  
Some scholars criticize this notion of relativity for making it difficult to measure 
disruptiveness. Danneels (2004) still holds the possibility open that a technology can be 
inherently disruptive. Christensen‟s response to this is that the disruptive innovation 
framework relates to relativity in the same way as other strategy frameworks relate to 
relativity, for example that an innovation can be distant from the core of one company and 
close to the core of another. (Christensen, 2006). 
According to the notion of relativity it is necessary when analyzing a possible disruptive 
innovation to relate it to other companies‟ business models. In the classic examples of 
disruptive innovations, for example the disk-drive industry, it was easy to find the related 
business models, which were the incumbents in the disk-drive industry. Other disruptive 
innovations can be more difficult to relate to other business models, and they can as 
mentioned be related to several other business models. Even though it can be a demanding 
exercise, only few innovations cannot be related to any existing business models.  
HOC insurance is not intuitively easy to relate to other specific business models in the same 
way as for example in the disk-drive industry. HOC insurance appears outward as a product 
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that emerges from the insurance industry, while the activities within the HOC insurance 
company may remind of the activities that are performed in a law firm. HOC insurance can be 
a sustaining innovation in relation to insurance companies, and disruptive in relation to law 
firms. It can also be a disruptive innovation to the incumbent insurance companies, for 
example if the home ownership companies‟ business model is disruptive to the established 
insurance companies‟ business model. If certain law firms offer HOC insurance it can be a 
sustaining innovation for these law firms. As a strategic tool disruptive innovation theory, 
based on market relativity, may contribute to blur out the boundaries between previous well 
defined industries, or even professions, like the legal profession. 
 
2.6 The predictive effect of the disruptive innovation theory 
Danneels (2004) argues that the term “disruptive innovation” is too loose and separate from 
its theoretical foundations. He suggests this at one of the reasons that established companies 
are skeptical to disruptive innovation. He proposes to develop predictions that can be tested 
about which technologies will be disruptive or not.  
A common critique of the theory of disruptive innovations is that it is based on historical data. 
The predictive use of the theory of disruptive innovation has been challenged by many 
scholars. Tellis (2006) asks that if one has to wait until the disruption has occurred, what 
predictive value is there in the theory. Govindarajan and Kopalle (2006) address this issue and 
concludes that even if the framework at this moment “may not help predict ex ante if a 
technology will be disruptive, the framework helps make ex ante predictions about the type of 
firms likely to develop disruptive innovations, thus presenting fruitful opportunities for future 
research” (Govindarajan & Kopalle, 2006, p. 17). 
Christensen (2006) refutes the fear expressed by Danneels (2004) and others that his model 
does not provide the ability to predict what will happen. A theory, according to Christensen, 
must: 
“Help evaluate a technology after it has been conceived or to evaluate a business 
venture after it has been proposed or launched. The theory must provide the 
ability to predict what will happen to the incumbents and entrants in the future if 
they take different actions relative to the innovation. The earlier we these 
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predictions can be made after conception, of course, the better.”(Christensen, 
2006, p. 45) 
Christensen (2006) provides 4 publicly documented examples of how the model was used to 
predict the impact of technologies across the spectrum of maturity. The predictions were in 
each case made, ex-ante, to help the incumbent leader see and address the threat before it was 
too late to take action. The first example is Teradyne‟s PC-sized tester using CMOS 
technology which was disruptive to traditional semiconductor test equipment. Second is an 
example from The Innovator‟s Dilemma, where is mentioned the flash memory in relation to 
hard disk drives (Christensen, 1997). Christensen (2006) observed that Flash memory was 
substituting for the Toshiba Microdrive in the lower-end models of the Apple iPod, and 
pointed at the extensive use of mass storage memory sticks. Third example is the AMD/Cyrix 
processors in relation to Intel‟s processors. Fourth example is when Kodak launched its Easy 
Share digital camera in relation to film, after mid-stream discovering that they were wrong 
when they tried to compete on a “sustaining innovation” basis against film and against Sony 
and Canon. 
Yu and Hang (2010) conclude that based on the causes of incumbent firms‟ success or failure 
and subsequent solutions, we may be in a better position to tell the fate of a firm in a new 
wave of disruptive innovation. Thus they are indicating that disruptive innovation theory can 
be applied to anticipate the future of firms. On the other hand we cannot know for certain 
what would have happened if a company had taken another course of action than it did. But 
neither does any assertion that the model cannot be used to predict outcomes (Christensen, 
2006). Although there has been a discussion about the predictability of disruptive innovation 
theory, the literature seems to assume that there is at least something that can be predicted. If 
not, the vast literature on other parts of the theory would seem like a great waste of 
intellectual capacity. 
If disruption can be predicted a relevant question is if HOC insurance was a missed 
opportunity, or at least a visible threat, for law firms or insurance companies, or both. The 
future will have to show if the knowledge of the disruptive innovation theory can be used to 
generate future profits for established legal providers or entrants. If the answer is yes, one 
should be able to make predictions about for example a specialized consumer service similar 
to home ownership insurance, within one legal field. This could help both incumbents and 
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entrants to position themselves to exploit disruptive processes instead of being a victim to the 
same. 
 
2.7 Organize to enable disruption 
Innovation literature has generally found that discontinuous innovations are developed and 
commercialized by new entrants (Christensen & Bower, 1996; Foster, 1986; Henderson & 
Clark, 1990; Tushman & Anderson, 1986). Yu and Hang (2010) relate this to the research on 
disruptive innovation arguing that entrant firms have a better chance of success in 
discontinuous innovation compared with incumbent firms because of their smaller sizes, 
shorter histories and more limited commitments to value networks and current technological 
paradigms.  On the other hand some large incumbent firms have managed to identify and 
exploit disruptive technologies before being disrupted by others (Christensen, 2006). After 
realizing this, the literature has searched for other possible correlations and causes for the 
types of businesses that succeed with disruptive innovation.   
Christensen‟s solution to  succeed with disruptive innovation within existing organizations is 
to organize the disruptive innovation project sheltered from the regular organization 
(Christensen & Raynor, 2003). Since Christensen does not differentiate between different 
types of disruptive innovations, one cannot demand that he offers more than one solution to 
the incumbent‟s problem when they are facing disruptive innovations. Christensen argues that 
all of the incumbent leaders who succeeded at disruption had maintained their industry-
leading position by setting up an autonomous business unit and by giving it unfettered 
freedom to forge a very different business model appropriate to the situation (Christensen, 
2006). The type of autonomous team should be decided based on the actual innovation‟s fit 
with the organization‟s processes (Christensen & Raynor, 2003).  
Christensen (1997) states that disruptive technological innovations eventually will grow to 
dominate the market. Markides (2006) argues that as such the disruptive innovation is a 
serious threat for incumbent firms and that “the only way to respond is to accept it and find 
ways to exploit it.” The dominating accepted solution suggested by Christensen and Raynor 
(2003), namely to create a separate unit is contradicted by Markides (2006) when it comes to 
business-model innovations (strategic innovations). He thinks that for a business-model 
innovation the new way of competing in the business usually grows quickly to a certain 
percent of the market but fails to completely overtake the traditional way of competing. He 
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uses internet banking, internet brokerage and low-cost airlines as examples of disruptive 
business-models that have grown rapidly, but only captured 10-20% of the market. “In market 
after market, new ways of competing grow to a respectable size but never really replace the 
old ways. Nor are these innovations expected to grow in the future to 100% of their markets” 
(Markides, 2006, p. 21). Christensen (2006) accepts that inaction can be the right course of 
action if survival is the objective function of management, but not if the objective function 
should be to maximize shareholder value. 
Charitou and Markides (2003) showed that a company has several options when deciding how 
to respond to disruptive business-model innovations. Markides (2006) summarizes that the 
established firm has other alternatives to consider: “including investing its limited resources 
in adjacent markets or taking its existing business model internationally. Given its other 
growth options – and given its limited resources – the decision to invest in the disruption may 
rank low on its priority list” (Markides, 2006, p. 22). He states that established companies 
could exploit disruptive strategic innovations in a number of ways, and they do not 
necessarily need to use a separate unit for it. 
Markides (2006) finds reasons for established firms to invest in disruptive business model 
innovations only in three circumstances. 1) When they enter a new market where entrenched 
competitors have first-mover advantages. 2) When their current strategy or business model is 
clearly inappropriate and the firm is facing a crisis. 3) When they are attempting to scale up a 
new-to-the-world product to make it attractive to the mass market.  
Charitou and Markides (2003) showed through a survey of 98 companies that incumbents 
react to disruptive threats in different ways, and indeed more than the one proposed by 
Christensen. They found that these could be categorized in 5 different types of responses. This 
is to focus on existing business, ignore the innovation, disrupt the disruption, adopt the 
innovation, or embrace it and scale up the innovation. Markides and Geroski (2005) found 
that early pioneers that create new-to-the-world markets with radical innovations are very 
rarely the ones that scale them up from little niches to big, mass markets. Therefore Markides 
(2006) concludes that Christensen and Raynor (2003) are wrong when they offer one unified 
solution to achieve disruptive innovation. Markides and Geroski (2005) explored how 
companies can exploit these disruptive innovations. They propose that established companies 
should leave this kind of innovation to start-ups and then enter the market, and scale the 
innovations up, when the dominant design is about to emerge. Markides (2006) proposes that 
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in practice this means to have a network of feeder firms, and scale up the successful ones. He 
also notes that this is an accepted business model in creative industries such as music and 
book publishing. Therefore it should be possible to use an analogy from these industries to 
other creative industries. 
Organizations with capabilities to cope with both radical and incremental innovations are 
often referred to as ambidextrous organizations. This has been proposed as a solution to 
manage discontinuous innovations (Tushman & O'Reilly, 2002, 1996). Yu and Hang (2010) 
comment on this path, but argues that  since disruptive innovations, due to the initial inferior 
performance, cannot attract the same attention from senior managers and existing customers, 
this may not be applicable in the case of disruptive innovation. 
If disruptive to other businesses what would be the best way to organize for an incumbent to 
succeed and be profitable with HOC insurance. We can see that for a law firm it probably 
would be Christensen‟s solution, while for an insurance company it would probably have 
been Markides‟ solution. It is interesting to see this example of a product that merges two 
industries, and that the two industries actually would have to think different in organizing the 
same product. So early in the early days of HOC insurance for example, to follow a best 
practice from similar companies could lead wrong for both. 
 
2.8 The early failure of incumbents in disruptive markets 
Sometimes it is observed that incumbents come up with innovations that later show to be 
disruptive, but fail to commercialize these, while later entrants succeed with the same 
innovations. This phenomena is referred to as cramming (Christensen, Roth, & Anthony, 
2004). Cramming is when a firm tries to cram the disruptive opportunity into its mainstream 
market, which tends to reject the disruption. This creates space for new companies to exploit 
the same innovation in new markets or in the low end of the existing market, thus creating the 
real disruptive innovation. Christensen et al. (2004) state that the problem with cramming is 
that “it changes the innovation in ways that obviate its inherent disruptive energy. It takes an 
innovation from a circumstance in which its unique features are valuable to a circumstance in 
which its unique features are a liability” (Christensen et al., 2004, p. 39). According to 
Christensen et al. (2004) cramming explains why so many disruptive innovations originate 
from within incumbents but are ultimately commercialized by separate organizations. 
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Sometimes frustrated managers and engineers leave an incumbent to form a new company, 
and discover a new market where the innovation has value (Christensen et al., 2004). 
In the beginning incumbent insurance companies tried to sell their own HOC insurance 
schemes. The product was too expensive and complex and the real-estate brokers did not want 
to sell it. It is reasonable to think that the new product was created within existing frames and 
processes, and sold much in the same way as other insurance products. The incumbent 
insurance companies complained about bad profitability and then one by one left the market 
for HOC insurance while the market was still immature.  
In other words the insurance companies tried to sell a product that had the potential to be 
disruptive to law firms, but when they didn‟t manage to sell it profitably, they let entrants 
create new insurance companies with business models that was better suited to be disruptive 
to law firms. But in the same operation the incumbent insurance companies took the risk that 
these new business models in a longer perspective could also show to be disruptive to the 
incumbent insurance companies themselves. A real threat to insurance companies‟ existing 
business would it first be if these entrants started exploiting their disruptive business models 
to attack the insurance incumbents‟ existing insurance schemes with low-end disruptive 
innovations. 
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3 Research methodology 
3.1 Preamble and study setup 
3.1.1 Preamble 
The legal industry has traditionally not been well suited for studies on industry changes. The 
gradual corporatization of legal services makes the industry more adept for research, and may 
give researchers and scholars a better foothold for theory building. Through systemizing and 
productizing of one legal field, the HOC insurance companies have left their footprint in legal 
records in Norway in a remarkable way. This adds a quantitative dimension to the study of an 
industry that mostly has been the subject of qualitative studies and experience based literature. 
The data examined in this study indeed tell a story about industry change, but also needs to be 
treated with care. Through careful interpretation and generalization it is my hope that this 
study can offer a better foothold for theory building on changes in the legal industry, and a 
better understanding of the mechanisms in the market for legal services. As the measures used 
in this study are not exact, this section includes discussion and definitions in the context of 
HOC insurance and the legal market.  The definitions of the legal market that faces disruption, 
and of a new market for HOC insurance, are addressed. The HOC insurance innovation itself 
is also operationalized in this section. 
3.1.2 Defining the market 
Even though disruptive innovation is associated with the failure of big firms and revolutionary 
change of industries, it is clear that, if disruptive, home ownership insurance has only 
potential to disrupt one niche within legal work, or among the services that law firms offer 
today. This niche is to handle claims from home buyers on behalf of home sellers. The 
definition of disruption addresses markets, and positions the disruptive innovation in relation 
to existing markets where other companies (hopefully) make a profit. In the case of HOC 
insurance, the innovation addresses one of the markets where the legal profession, makes its 
profits. In the same way the examples that have been used to illustrate disruptive innovation, 
some of them are of innovations that have led to the disruptee‟s bankruptcy, while others have 
only disrupted the old market-leaders within certain niches or technologies. 
The “market” used for examination of disruptiveness in relation to law firms in this study, is 
the market for legal services. Thus it is anticipated that representing home sellers in court is a 
representative measure of the market for law firms‟ services within the legal field of handling 
claims derived from home sales. Therefore a decrease in the proportion of cases litigated by 
28 
 
law firms in comparison to other (new) actors is anticipated to tell whether law firms are 
facing services or products that are disruptive to their business in this niche. Of course the 
sampled court records will only be the “tip of the iceberg” of cases handled by lawyers and 
HOC insurance companies. Today the Norwegian HOC companies receive over 11.000 
claims per year, but most of them are immediately declined. In the same way a law firm will 
have several cases that are solved by negotiations or arbitration, without having to go to the 
courts. 
Traditionally law firms have had a monopoly litigating cases in court, protected by 
regulations in most jurisdictions. To a great extent lawyers still have this privilege in Norway. 
Law firms also have to be owned by persons that work in the law firm (typically lawyers). In 
other words, law firms cannot be funded by external investors. The mechanism the HOC 
insurance companies use to avoid conflicting with the regulations, is that they enter the 
courtroom as one of the parties (most often together with the seller) and thereby are 
representing themselves in court, which is allowed. This means that this phenomenon is 
visible in legal records, and that legal records thereby provide valuable data of a process 
where law firms might have been substituted by HOC insurance companies. Due to the 
regulations and the strong profession, the legal market traditionally has consisted of similar 
type of businesses, with one uniform business model serving 100 % of the market. This 
phenomenon can be seen for several professions, for example within health care and 
education. 
3.1.3 The emergence of a market for home ownership insurance in Norway 
The first insurance companies offering home ownership insurance in Norway appeared in the 
mid 90‟s. The first product offered was from the traditional Norwegian insurance company 
Vesta, in cooperation with a smaller company, Skagerak Forsikring, in 1996/97. This product 
was more complicated and more expensive than the HOC insurance schemes of today. This 
product was not sold through real-estate brokers as most HOC insurances were later. In 
1996/98 Norwegian Broker, Nor Eiendomsmegling and Estate developed a new product that 
later became the model for several providers of HOC insurance schemes. After the early 
experimentation with HOC insurance in Norway, several insurance companies, both new and 
established, entered the evolving new market for this kind of insurance. This includes: Vesta, 
If, Cigna, Gjensidige, Gerling, Tennant, Ace Insurance and Anticimex. Later also Protector 
Forsikring and AmTrust. 
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One of the early entrants in this market was Ace Insurance. In 1999 Ace Insurance bought 
Cigna Insurance and thereby entered the Norwegian market for HOC insurance. They 
organized their HOC insurance business in cooperation with Norwegian Broker (NB) and 
NB‟s partner Norwegian Claims Link (NCL). The cooperation was structured so that NB 
would sell and promote the insurance (through real-estate brokers), NCL would do the claim 
handling and Ace Insurance would only take on the insured risk. This model was initiated by 
the people behind NB and NCL. Ace Insurance then became market leader with 
approximately 50 % of the market. In 2004 Ace Insurance decided to exit the market because 
of bad profitability and an increasingly negative publicity around the HOC insurance 
schemes. After Ace Insurance decided to exit the market Norwegian Broker/ NCL had to look 
for a new partner. They then decided to enter into agreement with Protector Forsikring AS, 
which was a startup insurance company founded in 2004, based on a business idea to offer 
cost-efficient insurance schemes to medium and large business customers. The cooperation 
with Protector Forsikring AS didn‟t last long. Within half a year Protector terminated the 
agreement with NB/NCL, due to dissatisfaction with the terms. Protector announced that 
NB/NCL demanded too much for their services, and that this made it difficult for Protector to 
continue with the partnership. From then on Protector established its own organization to 
provide HOC insurance. Protector has dealt directly with real estate agents to sell their 
products and treated the received claims with their own legal staff/lawyers. NCL/NB have 
later entered into new agreements with some other HOC companies, of which AmTrust has 
become the biggest one. In 2012 two main actors were left: Protector and AmTrust. The 
companies that have decided to exit the market include Vesta, IF, Ace, Gerling, Anticimex, 
Zürich, Reliance, Gjensidige and Tennant.  In December 2000 Gerling, Gjensidige Tennant 
and Vesta announced to the press (Aftenposten) that the product was not profitable for them, 
and that they had decided to quit selling this type of insurance. IF announced that it lost 
money on the product, but would keep it in their portfolio to track the market for a while. At 
the same time Anticimex introduced HOC insurance. 
Anticimex decided to exit the market for HOC insurance in 2012. This led to that in 2013 two 
companies with two different business models remained as main actors of the market for 
HOC insurance in Norway. While AmTrust outsources the claim handling and brokerage of 
its insurances, Protector organizes everything within their own organization. 
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Figure 1. Norwegian providers of HOC insurance. 
3.1.4 Operationalization of the HOC-innovation 
A HOC insurance policy is, of course, another product (or service) than what is traditionally 
served by law firms. Only a portion of the insurance policies sold end up in court, in the same 
way as traditional law firms settle a great portion of cases outside the courtrooms. From this 
angle HOC insurance may be viewed as a new product, with a potential to be disruptive to 
existing businesses, and it can be disruptive to several types of other businesses. It can also be 
disruptive to one business and sustaining to another (Christensen, 1997). Although not 
examined in this study, it is an interesting question whether the business model of Norwegian 
HOC insurance companies is disruptive to the traditional insurance companies‟ business 
models. At least it is not sold the same way as ordinary house, car or personal injury insurance 
schemes. 
An implication of the relativity of the disruptive effect on existing markets, and the tendency 
for some disruptive innovations to create new markets is that it is difficult to project a future 
market-size for the innovation, as well as to define and measure the future market. The 
number of potential customers for an insurance scheme bought ex-ante is indeed bigger than 
the number of potential law firm clients buying a legal service ex-post. Consequently the price 
is also lower for the insurance, as it is bought as an insurance scheme and not as a payment 
for a (time consuming) service. One has to anticipate that it was difficult to know in advance 
how many home sellers that would buy the home ownership insurance, before any experience 
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was made with this type of insurance scheme in Norway. Neither was it possible to know if it 
would trigger a new market, or how quick it possibly would disrupt existing businesses. 
According to disruptive innovation theory it should be possible ex-ante to decide if HOC 
insurance was disruptive in relation to one or more specific businesses. It should also be 
possible to foresee a pace of disruption as soon as the phenomenon is observed, as long as the 
data-set is large enough to be significant (Christensen et al., 2008). A good dataset can be 
difficult to obtain early in the product-cycle if the new innovation is sold in a small-scale and 
not standardized way, which is true for many new products and services. 
Addressing the definition of disruptive innovation HOC insurance is more convenient than 
using traditional lawyers. The insurance is bought from the real estate broker, as an agent for 
the insurance company, before selling your property. Using a law firm would for most 
consumers mean to enter an unknown sphere, screening and supervision of the work of the 
chosen lawyer. The insurance is also a simpler product than law firms‟ services. Once bought 
you don‟t have to relate to potential dissatisfied home buyers and possible future claims, 
simply referring the home buyer to your insurance company, which also guarantees for 
possible valid claims on your behalf. A HOC insurance policy is indeed cheaper than using a 
law firm after the claim has been received. On the other hand the prices of the two products 
cannot be compared directly, as they are two different products, or services. The home seller 
has to take the decision of buying the insurance or not before he knows if there will be a 
claim. This means that the expected loss will vary from seller to seller based on their personal 
perception of how likely and how expensive a future claim will be. On average there will be a 
claim in 25% of all home sales. As most consumers are risk averse it is likely that they will 
perceive the home ownership insurance as a “cheap” way to avoid a potential problem 
Intuitively one should think that more home sellers would buy legal assistance if they had the 
choice of buying it in the form of an insurance before selling their house, than if they only had 
the choice of buying a lawyer‟s services after a claim is received. Of course this would mean 
that many insurance policy holders wouldn‟t use their insurance, but this is the nature of 
insurance policies. From starting selling insurance policies a new set of customers would 
emerge automatically, namely home sellers that don‟t receive any claim from the 
corresponding home buyers. In addition one should think that sellers that generally find 
lawyers too expensive also would be a new set of customers, or at least unattractive customers 
to law firms. In general many consumers would never consider to use a lawyer or a traditional 
law firm. From the above mentioned it can be said that HOC insurance generally has a 
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potential to be disruptive to the legal field of advising home sellers. However, the disruptive 
impact cannot be decided from the characteristics of the product itself, but have to be molded 
into each business‟ strategy. In turn disruptive strategies greatly increase the odds of 
competitive success (Christensen & Raynor, 2003).  
If HOC insurance is a new-market disruption it should be so simple, affordable and 
convenient that it would attract a new type of customers. This means that the buyers of the 
HOC insurance should normally not consider using law firms‟ services. One would also like 
to see the emergence of a new value network, a network where the activities in the network 
are profitable for all the participants. This might mean that some companies decide not to 
participate because the activities within the new network are in conflict with existing 
processes, resources or values. Regarding HOC insurance, participants in a new value 
network could be companies from several established industries, for example established law 
firms and insurance companies. After all HOC insurance is an insurance against legal liability, 
which should make the product interesting for these two established industries. When a new 
value network is established, and eventually good enough for customers that previously have 
used established businesses‟ services, one would try to observe a migration from the old value 
network to the new value network. If the migrating customers are the least profitable for the 
old value network, the established businesses will according to disruptive innovation theory 
often let them go without a fight, and instead focus on the higher-margin work. 
3.2 Data collection 
Building on the assumption that HOC insurance has the potential to be disruptive to the legal 
field of advising home sellers I wanted to test this assumption to see if the theory of disruptive 
innovation theory could explain the development in the legal market. I decided to do an 
empirical study based on legal records to find whether the introduction of HOC insurance 
have had any impact on law firms, and if yes, if this impact have been or can be disruptive to 
them. If regarded as disruptive, I would also try to assess how fast the disruption process 
went. 
To test the research questions, I first collected a sample of all cases regarding HOCs between 
private parties from the years 1995-2012, from the Norwegian courts of appeal. These cases 
were extracted from the online database Lovdata, which contains most cases from the 
Norwegian courts of appeal. The cases were grouped based on year and if the seller side was 
represented by a law firm or an insurance company. This analysis showed an interesting 
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pattern, but as it was a limited number of cases each year (between 20 and 40) and the records 
were not complimentary for the years 1993-1995, it was necessary to do a another study to 
verify the pattern. Also, as HOC insurance is a product targeting consumers, it was anticipated 
that most cases would be solved at the lowest level possible. Therefore it was desirable to do a 
study of the lowest level possible in the court system. 
I decided to collect data from the Oslo District Court, because they store their legal records 25 
years back. Other district courts I contacted had already destroyed some of the records. Oslo 
District Court is the largest district court in Norway with about 1000 civil cases each year. I 
conducted an archival analysis of legal records at Oslo District Court during the spring 2013. 
All civil cases from the years 1993 until September 2013 were screened. From this sample 
every case between private parties, regarding HOCs, were registered, 615 in total. The 
number of cases recorded each year varied between 6 and 50 cases, following the entrance of 
the Norwegian home sales act in January 1993. The screening and the registering of cases had 
to be done manually, since the District Court only digitizes parts of its records. The legal 
records are stored in the basement of the Oslo Courthouse, only available for internal use and 
research purposes. I was fortunate to get admission to the records and a temporary office in 
the courthouse for a period of 2 weeks. The screening was conducted by manually going 
through the table of contents for each year, and then look up each relevant record. The 
recorded information for each case was case-reference, value of the property sold, if a HOC 
company represented the seller, name of HOC insurance company involved and if the claim 
was valid: the value of the judgment. I used approximately 11 days to manually register the 
legal records. 
The analysis was conducted using a simple time-series of the number of cases taken to court 
by insurance companies, the number of cases taken to court by insurance companies and the 
total amount of cases, from the years 1993 until 2012. The pattern was then analyzed to see if 
home ownership companies overtook the market of representing home sellers when faced 
with a claim from the corresponding home buyers. The market for HOC insurance in Norway 
was also in the beginning characterized by many entrants of various size and form. To get an 
impression of how the market for home ownership insurance has developed the ratio between 
the different HOC insurance companies each year was also analyzed. There are also several 
common beliefs, or disbeliefs, of the links between home prices, home sales, the number of 
conflicts and HOC insurance. To test if the figures collected from legal records were 
correlated with home prices or the number of home sales, I collected these figures to compare.  
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4 Results 
4.1 Analysis 
4.1.1 The development in home sales and home prices. 
                      The number of properties sold in Norway has increased steadily from around 38000 in 1993 
to around 89000 in 2012, except in the period from 2007 to 2009 when the amount of 
properties sold decreased from 81000 to 70000. This was the same period as the international 
financial crisis, and the home prices also dropped 5-10%, but far from as much as in other 
countries. 
 
 
Figure 3. The number of properties sold in Norway each year (SSB). 
 
From 1988 to 1993 the home prices in Norway decreased significantly due to the Norwegian 
bank crisis in this period, where several Norwegian banks went bankrupt and were taken over 
by the Norwegian state. From 1993 home prices have increased steadily, except the already 
mentioned small decrease in 2007-2009. Home prices in Norway were approximately 6 times 
higher in 2013 than they were in 1993. 
0
20000
40000
60000
80000
100000
1
9
9
3
1
9
9
5
1
9
9
7
1
9
9
9
2
0
0
1
2
0
0
3
2
0
0
5
2
0
0
7
2
0
0
9
2
0
1
1
2
0
1
3
Number of sold properties
Sold properties
35 
 
 
Figure 4. The development of home prices in Norway by year. Norges 
Eiendomsmeglerforbund (http://www.nef.no/xp/pub/topp/boligprisstatistikk). 
 
 
4.1.2 Figures gathered from HOC insurance companies 
 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Revenue [MNOK] <104 372 271 297 263 265 332 400 426 450 
Number of claims 
  
4300 4000 4000 3800 4200 4500 4300 4500 
Number of lawsuits 
  
225 319 227 230 181 253 509* 500* 
Number of final judgements 
      
161 169 238 300 
Hit Ratio 
   
63 % 70 % 73 % 75 % 80 % 80 % 80 % 
Customer Satisfaction [/100] 
  
80 79 87 81 88 92 93 94 
Reported market share 90 % 75 % 54 % 54 % 50 % 50 % 50 % 50 % 50 %    50 % 
 
        
Table 1. Figures from Protector Forsikring AS gathered from annual reports. 
 
Protector Forsikring ASA is a public listed company and the annual reports are therefore 
public available. The available information is shown in table 1. Protector reports to have 
received around 4500 claims from home buyers in 2013. Norwegian Claims Link has 
informed that they have around 7000 claims in the same period. These figures are only 
indicative, and it will vary how and when the different companies register a claim. Further it 
can be deducted from the figures in table 1 that Protector‟s market share has decreased since it 
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entered the market in 2004, due to the increased competition from AmTrust, who uses 
Norwegian Claims Link as claim handlers. The hit ratio is the percentage of the home sellers 
that sell their property through a real-estate agent that offers Protector‟s insurance, that choose 
to buy the HOC insurance. As we can see this ration has increased from 63% in 2006 to 80% 
in 2012. Generally Protector reports that today at least 80% of home sellers buy HOC 
insurance. Protector also reports their customers‟ satisfaction on a scale from 0-100. This 
indicates that their customers were more satisfied with the product in 2013 than in 2006. 
 
4.1.3 Cases in Oslo District Court 
Year 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13* 
Without insurance 11 6 17 9 22 25 30 46 35 27 29 21 15 14 16 11 13 11 13 11 1* 
With insurance 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 16 20 18 9 21 22 20 13 17 14 28 25* 
Total 11 6 17 9 22 25 30 46 43 43 49 39 24 35 38 31 26 28 27 39 26* 
 
Table 2: Number of cases in Oslo District Court (*the figures for 2013 include only 8 months) 
 
 
Figure 5. Number of cases in Oslo District Court. 
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Until 2000 none of the home sellers in the recorded cases were represented by a home 
ownership insurance company. This is due to that the first companies offering HOC insurance 
in Norway did their first attempts to sell their new product first from 1996/97. In the same 
period the number of such cases grew rapidly, following the introduction of the Norwegian 
home sales act in 1993. This means that the growth in the number of the recorded litigated 
cases for home sellers in this period was absorbed by law firms. 
In Oslo District Court the total number of cases grew steadily until it reached 46 in 2000 and 
then peaked with 50 cases in 2003. The number of home sellers represented by law firms 
decreased from 46 in 2003 to 29 in 2003. In the same period the number of home sellers 
represented by a HOC insurance company increased from 0 to 21. In other words this period 
represents a significant replacement of law firms with HOC insurance companies in Oslo 
District Court, with the total amount of cases relatively stable. 
From 2003 until 2005 the total number of cases decreases significant from 50 to 24. Both law 
firms and home ownership companies half the number of cases in this period. For law firms 
this period do not necessarily reflect anything else than a continuation of the negative trend. 
For HOC insurance companies this period looks like a temporary drawback. The reason 
cannot be determined for sure, but this was the period when the former market leader, Ace 
Insurance, together with several other insurance companies, decided to quit offering home 
ownership insurance. Following Ace Insurance‟s exit, a new insurance company, Protector 
Forsikring AS, entered the market and rapidly thereafter took over the position as market 
leader among the HOC insurance companies. Later also followed by AmTrust. 
From 2005 to 2007 the total number of cases increases from 24 to 38. While law firms only 
increase from 15 to 16, the home ownership insurance companies increase from 9 to 22 cases. 
This period represent a upturn for HOC insurance companies back to the level before 2004. 
This supports the suggestion that the sharp downturn between 2004 and 2005 was because of 
the market turbulence in this period. 
From 2007 until 2011 home ownership insurance companies continue representing some more 
home sellers than the law firms. Then in 2012, again following an increase in the total number 
of cases with the district court, the home ownership insurance companies represents about ¾ 
of home sellers. In 2013, according to the recorded number of cases which represented 8 of 
the 12 months of the year, home ownership insurance companies represent over 90 % of home 
sellers.  
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4.1.4 Cases in Norwegian Courts of Appeal 
Year 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 
Withouth insurance 3 2 9 17 19 19 31 28 28 17 15 17 16 19 19 21 15 20 13 11 
With insurance 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 7 5 4 7 6 10 22 23 18 21 21 16 
Total 3 2 9 17 19 19 31 29 35 22 19 24 22 29 41 44 33 41 34 27 
 
Table 3: Number of cases in Norwegian Courts of Appeal. 
 
Figure 6. Number of cases in the Norwegian Courts of appeal. 
 
In the courts of appeal the development is similar to Oslo District Court until 2000. The 
growth in the number of cases is fully absorbed by law firms. From there the number of 
insurance companies‟ cases is low and stable from 2000 until 2005. The reason for this cannot 
be determined for sure, but it is reasonable to expect that the HOC companies were careful 
with appealing too many cases the first years. In the same period the total number of cases 
decreases significantly from 29 in 2000 to 21 in 2005. This decrease in total cases refers to 
law firms going from representing 28 home sellers in 2000 to 16 in 2005. Thus HOC 
companies increase their share of the total cases significant in this period. From 2006 until 
2008 insurance companies increase from 10 to 23 cases, while law firms go from 19 to 21. 
The total number of recorded cases go from 29 to 44 in this period, thus almost all of the 
increase is due to the insurance companies. From 2009 the total number of cases decreases, 
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while law firms and insurance companies represent sellers in about 50% of the cases each. 
Toward 2011/2012 insurance companies increase their share to about 60%. 
 
 
 
 
4.1.5 The ratio between HOC insurance companies? 
 
Figure 7. Home sellers represented by each insurance company in Oslo Tingrett.  
 
Figure 7 shows the number of cases where sellers were represented by each HOC company 
each year in Oslo Tingrett. From the HOC companies started to represent sellers in 2001 they 
have substituted law firms as seen in figure 2 and 3. Figure 5 elaborates on how the market 
has developed between the different insurance entrants. The years between 2001 and 2004 are 
characterized by several entrants, with Ace Insurance as market leader. 2004 to 2007 are 
characterized by Ace‟s and several other actors‟ exit in 2004 and Protector and AmTrust 
entering the market. The numbers of the years from 2008 – 2013 reflect that Protector and 
AmTrust has established themselves as the two dominating actors in this market. 
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4.1.6 Average prices of properties with claims in Oslo Tingrett 
 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
With 
insurance 2381235 3265000 2555600 2890882 3607667 2574615 2573667 3082778 6972692 4604545 6320833 3812500 
Without 2054286 2595313 2742619 2855556 3321875 3437500 3166842 3894412 3239583 4153783 4120385 4148000 
Total 2325415 3015814 2640978 2872714 3508261 3097576 2905147 3613462 5180800 4337427 5176600 4054806 
 
Table 4. Average prices of properties with claims in Oslo Tingrett from 2001 to 2012 in 
NOK. 
 
 
Figure 8. Average prices of houses with claim from buyer in Oslo Tingrett, with HOC insurance, 
without HOC insurance and total. 
 
Figure 8 shows the average prices of houses sold between private parties, referred to in 
disputes in Oslo Tingrett from HOC companies entered the courtrooms in 2001 until 2012. 
There is no observable difference between high or low priced properties with regard to if they 
end up in court represented by a law firm or a HOC insurance company. The deviations 
observed in 2011 and 2009 are partly because of few observations and due to claims from 4 
extraordinary expensive houses, all of which were represented by law firms. These properties 
were sold for respectively MNOK 25 and 12 in 2011 and 24 and 18 in 2009. On the other 
hand a property of MNOK 14 was represented by a HOC company in 2006, MNOK 11 in 
2008 and MNOK 19 in 2012.   (and MNOK 24 in 2013)  
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4.1.7 Development within different price segments (2012 adjusted prices) 
 
To compare the development within different price categories the value of the homes with 
claims in Oslo Tingrett were adjusted to 2012 prices. They were then categorized in the 
categories MNOK 0-5, 5-10 and 10+. The development is shown in tables 5, 6 and 7, and 
figure 8. 
 
WITH/WITHOUT 2001-2003 2004-2006 2007-2009 2010-2012 
 MNOK 10+ 2/11 1/6 4/4 1/5 
MNOK 5 - 10 16/16 21/11 10/8 16/5 
MNOK 0 - 5 26/59 23/28 34/25 55/23 
 
Table 5. Number of cases with/without HOC insurance in the categories NOK 0-5, 5-10 and 
10+, in different time periods in Oslo Tingrett.  
 
 
 
PROPORTION 2001-2003 2004-2006 2007-2009 2010-2012 
MNOK 10+ 0,15 0,14 0,50 0,17 
MNOK 5 - 10 0,50 0,66 0,56 0,76 
MNOK 0 - 5 0,31 0,45 0,58 0,62 
All years 0,34 0,50 0,56 0,63 
 
Table 6. Proportion of cases with HOC insurance in the categories NOK 0-5, 5-10 and 10+, in 
different time periods in Oslo Tingrett. 
 
VALUE[NOK] 2001-2003 2004-2006 2007-2009 2010-2012 
MNOK 10+ 215 968 209 85 764 335 123 441 427 98 722 400 
MNOK 5 - 10 217 865 107 209 762 917 122 035 980 143 327 685 
MNOK 0 - 5 247 233 071 154 040 524 159 638 512 176 796 612 
 
Table 7. Total value of houses with disputes in Oslo Tingrett in the categories NOK 0-5, 5-10 
and 10+, in different time periods. 
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Figure 9. Development within different time periods. The sizes of the bubbles indicate the 
size of the total value of homes in the period (table 7), while the pies indicate the proportion 
of the cases where the seller is represented by a HOC Insurance company or a law firm (table 
5). 
 
The figures show that the number of cases is largest in the category MNOK 0-5 and smallest 
in the category 10+ (Table 5). On the other hand the segment over MNOK 10 is also a 
substantial market because of the total value of the properties sold in the category 10+ (Table 
7). The collected data indicates that the substitution process in the beginning went faster in the 
segment MNOK 5-10. In the segment MNOK 0-5 the substitution process starts more calmly, 
but with a more stable development. In the category 10+ the number of cases are small, but in 
general the figures may suggest that law firms has been able to protect this segment fairly 
good in the examined time period. Since the values of the homes are higher, the estimated 
profit will also be substantial in this segment, even if the number of claims is smaller. 
 
4.1.8 Estimates of market size with and without HOC-insurance 
Before 1993 HOC cases was a very small market for law firms. First with the introduction of 
the Home Ownership Act in 1993 this type of cases began to give more work for law firms. 
As the numbers of cases from the courts indicate, this niche grew in the years after 1993, 
According to figures from the Norwegian court administration the average number of this 
type of claims registered in the years 2008 – 2010 was around 800. According to statistics 
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gathered from a law firm that specializes on HOC cases, around 40% of their cases are sent to 
the courts. If one anticipates that the average legal expenses for a case in court would be 
around NOK 75000, and that for each case solved on a level in the court system 2-3 cases is 
solved outside court, with a cost of around NOK 20000, this indicates a potential market for 
traditional law firms‟ services today of around MNOK 100, if HOC insurance did not exist. 
Since HOC insurance exist today, a substantial amount of these 800 claims belong to the 
HOC insurance companies. 
Based on the figures for 2012 in Norway it was sold approximately 88000 houses. The 
average price of a home was MNOK 3.1. Multiplied with the ratio of home buyers that buy 
the HOC insurance one ends up with a total value of houses sold of BNOK 218. The average 
price of a HOC insurance is 0,35 % of the price that the house is sold for. This gives a market 
size for HOC insurance in Norway of around MNOK 763. In 2012 Protector had NOK 430 
millions (Table 1) in revenue from their HOC insurance. With a market size of approximately 
50% this indicates a total market for HOC insurance in Norway in 2013 of around MNOK 
860. Based on these two estimates it is reasonable to expect a total market for home 
ownership insurance in Norway of around MNOK 800 in 2012. 
The estimate of a potential market for law firms‟ services and the estimates of the market for 
HOC insurance leave a gap of approximately 7 times the size of the potential market of the 
business model existing before HOC insurance was introduced. The increased market, or a 
part of it, is a new market created by the HOC insurance innovation. 
 
4.2 Discussion 
From the introduction of HOC insurance schemes in Norway in 1996/97, the proportion of 
home sellers buying a HOC insurance policy has grown from 0 to about 80% of home sellers. 
After several providers in the beginning experimented with different types of insurance 
schemes and business models, a “shakeout” and consolidation took place. Today, two main 
competitors are left, with two different business models that both have shown themselves 
profitable. The development of HOC insurance has had an impact on the market for 
traditional law firms‟ services within this niche. Before HOC insurance schemes were 
introduced in Norway, a home seller had to counter any claim from a home buyer by engaging 
a lawyer or a law firm, or else the alternative was to handle the claim themselves. 
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A common opinion, often referred to in the press, is that the significant increase in home 
prices in Norway from 1993 is one of the reasons for the increased level of conflicts regarding 
home sales. The figures from Oslo Tingrett and the Norwegian courts of appeal show that the 
number of court cases regarding home sales between private parties increased from the 
introduction of the Homes Sales Act in 1993 until around 2001. From 2001 the number of 
cases has varied, but is not higher in 2013 than in 2001, despite a significant increase in both 
home prices (Figure 2) and home sales (Figure 3). In other words, the data collected in this 
study does not support this popular opinion. A more likely explanation is that the number of 
cases increased from 1993 because of the new regulations, and that the level of court cases 
peaked around 2001-2003. After 2001 the development has been impacted of HOC insurance 
companies, and the learning process in the evolution of this new industry. It is likely that they 
have experienced the cost of conflicts and searched to find an optimal level of conflicts. It is 
also reasonable to think that some of the variability is also due to the turbulence in the HOC 
insurance industry in the period.. 
A general hypothesis among lawyers has been that the HOC companies have contributed to 
create more conflicts and more work for the courts. The figures from Oslo Tingrett and the 
Norwegian courts of appeal do not support this popular hypothesis, as the number of HOC 
cases already was increasing before HOC insurance was introduced in Norway and started 
showing up in legal records in 2001 (Figure 4 and 5). Neither has the number of cases grown 
between 2001 and 2012, even though this has been a period with tremendous growth for the 
HOC insurance companies. It is more reasonable to think that the HOC insurance was 
introduced due to the increased number of such conflicts.  
The business model in which the HOC insurance was sold had an impact on the disruptive 
effect to law firms. The large established insurance companies‟ HOC insurance schemes were 
sold through established business models, and appeared therefore not as disruptive to law 
firms. It is easy to suspect at least some of the incumbents of forcing the new type of 
insurance into an existing insurance business model, also referred to as cramming 
(Christensen et al., 2004). Others, like Protector and AmTrust (NCL) created new business 
models that had more disruptive potential to law firms. These younger entrants in the 
Norwegian insurance market have to a substantial degree substituted themselves to law firms 
in the Norwegian courtrooms, within the legal niche of handling claims from home buyers on 
behalf of home sellers. Three of the elements included in the successful business models were 
the product itself; home ownership insurance, control of the claims handling, and the sales 
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strategy; to sell the products through real-estate brokers. The figures from January 2013 to 
September 2013 in Oslo Tingrett showed 1 case where the home seller was represented by a 
law firm and 26 cases by HOC insurance companies, indicating what has to be considered as a 
substantial disruption within this niche. The HOC insurance innovation is compatible with the 
definition of disruptive innovation give by Christensen and Raynor (2003), but also has the 
characteristics of a “new to the world” radical product innovation as proposed by Markides 
(2006).  
The total number of claims received by today‟s two market leaders, Protector Forsikring and 
AmTrust, amounts to around 11000 in 2013. Most of these claims are rejected from the HOC 
insurance companies after being assessed by trained staff. According to the figures from 
Protector (Table 1) 80% of today‟s home sellers buy HOC insurance when they sell their 
house. This means that 80% of home sellers can free of further charge have potential claims 
assessed by (more or less) qualified professionals with the HOC companies. Before, the 
average home seller was not a consumer of law firms‟ services. This indicates that the 
introduction of HOC companies has given more consumers access to legal services they 
wouldn‟t have access to before, thus indicating a new market of previous not-served home 
sellers in the low end of the old market. Even though the product was heavily criticized the 
first years, the critique has calmed and the annual survey from Protector Forsikring since 2006 
shows that their customers are more satisfied with the seller insurance in 2013 than in 2006 
(Table 1). This indicates that the product has become good enough for more and more 
customers, and thereby gradually has displaced law firms, as observed in the examined figures 
from the Norwegian courts. 
Although the substitution process has been going on for a long time period, law firms have 
not obviously defended their position within this niche. They have neither tried to develop 
competing HOC insurance schemes, or similar products, to take a share in the growing new 
market. The structure in the legal industry, from mainly consisting of one-man firms to only a 
few big corporations with many hundred lawyers, can contribute to explain these 
observations. For today‟s big law firms, a single home seller does not appear as a very 
profitable customer. It is therefore likely that even though law firms have spotted the 
development, they have concentrated on higher margin customers, typically business clients 
or the wealthier consumer clients. As the HOC insurance has improved and more and more 
potential clients have migrated to HOC insurance, the legal industry incumbents have simply 
let them go. 
46 
 
Assuming that law firms in the late 90‟s would prefer to continue representing home sellers in 
and outside of court, it would be interesting to get more knowledge about what caused them to 
lose this client group? To explain incumbents‟ failure facing disruptive innovations 
Christensen (1997) argues for management failure while others argue for the lack of market-
facing competencies, maybe especially the lack of focus on new customer-groups. HOC 
insurance schemes could have been a sustaining innovation to law firms if it was designed 
differently, or sold/controlled by law firms. It could also have been a sustaining innovation to 
law firms if law firms had captured the claims handling for the HOC insurance companies. 
Law firms have been involved in startup of HOC insurance, and Ace Insurance/NCL used 
external lawyers to represent them in court in their early days. This means that at least some 
law firms have been aware of the development of HOC insurances, and observed the changed 
preferences of their customers. Obviously they have defined home claims handling, as framed 
by the HOC companies, outside of their core activities, maybe regarded it as being outside 
their core competencies. A claims handling company like NCL does the same activities as a 
law firm, with its own legal staff and lawyers, but it only handles claims received by its 
partner insurance companies. An important difference is the market facing competence that 
NCL has through the linkage with its cooperating broker, Norwegian Broker. NCL can also 
be public owned because it is not regarded as a law firm.  
Theoretically only small adjustments would have been necessary for HOC insurance or claims 
handling to be future revenue centers for law firms, for example as a department for HOCs 
handling within a large law firm. As the growing market of HOC insurance was known to (at 
least some) law firms, the lack of market-facing competencies does not appear as a very likely 
explanation for not pursuing a business opportunity like this. Management failure or capture 
by the existing values, processes and resources, as defined by Christensen and Raynor (2003), 
seem more likely. Henderson (2006) also provide valuable hints to understand the failure of 
law firms in relation to the new market of HOC insurance. She believes that many disruptive 
innovations have a characteristic of reshaping the pattern of preferences in a market. 
Consumers that previously was used to either buy hourly billed legal services ex-post or 
handling the claim themselves now have another choice. As the time goes by more and more 
customers start to prefer to buy the legal service ex-ante on a fixed fee basis. This may also 
contribute to explain the difficulties law firms had in predicting the market of HOC insurance, 
because you actually shift consumer preferences. And the preferences could not shift before 
the consumers had the choice of HOC insurance. 
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These thoughts may not be very pressing when it comes to HOC insurance, but when the 
same reasons are applied on the buyer insurance and other promising legal insurance schemes 
the question begins to appear more pressing on law firms. Even if it appears as a pressing 
issue, the predictability of disruptive innovation theory sets the premises for the usefulness of 
this knowledge. Disruptive innovation theory literature generally accepts that it is possible to 
predict disruption, but the degree, pace and the possible existence of partly disruption are still 
discussed. According to this it should be possible to make predictions of disruptive 
innovations within other legal fields of practice. This of course has to be defined ex-ante, 
according to the definition of a disruptive innovation. The disruptive potential should be 
defined in relation to competing business models. As showed in the case of HOC insurance, 
future legal business models are not restricted to the known business models for providing 
legal services. One niche, or legal field of practice, can even consist of several competing 
business models as in the case of HOC insurance. 
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5 Conclusion and implications 
5.1 Conclusion 
In this thesis I have analyzed the introduction of HOC insurance in Norway through the lenses 
of disruptive innovation theory. I have related this new product in Norway, and associated 
business models, to the two traditional business models; law firms and insurance companies. 
The main questions have been if HOC insurance is disruptive to law firms within the legal 
field of handling claims for home sellers, and eventually how fast this has happened. Through 
examining these questions I have also followed the emergence of an industry of HOC 
insurance companies in Norway, which have positioned themselves between law firms and 
traditional insurance companies. This means that they are organized much as a traditional law 
firm, representing insurance holders, which internally are perceived like their “clients” even 
though the insurance company formally has taken over the claim from the home seller. On the 
other hand they are insurance companies, sell insurance schemes, and are perceived like 
insurance companies in the public. 
This thesis has provided one clear example of how the disruptive innovation theory 
framework can be applied on one legal field of practice. HOC insurance companies have 
displaced the role of law firms in court in this type of cases. HOC insurance has disrupted the 
legal niche of handling claims for home sellers in Norway within a time-span of 16-17 years, 
even though law firms still have a market in this niche due to a strong position the high-end 
market. So it looks like disruption is afoot in this segment, but contrary to the theory of 
disruptive innovation it is not evident that it began in the lower end (Christensen, 1997). On 
the other hand the development illustrated in Figure 9 indicates that the substitution process 
was slowest in the high-end segment, and that law firms still have a substantial market in this 
segment, in spite of a small amount of cases. The observed development of the substitution 
process seems more consistent with the theory of new-market encroachment of the detached 
type as suggested by Schmidt and Druehl (2008), where the innovation initially sells to a 
detached market and therefore could sell in both the lower and medium segments. As home 
sellers‟ preferences shifted (Henderson, 2006), more and more home sellers chose to buy the 
HOC insurance, thereby excluding a potential need for law firms services. 
The HOC insurance business model has co-existed with both law firms and insurance 
companies since 1996/97. Law firms are still selling hours billed by the hour, while traditional 
insurance companies offer cover of certain legal expenses through the regular home 
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insurance. Even if law firms can feel the competition from HOC insurance and traditional 
insurance companies are considering removing the coverage of legal expenses due to 
increased costs the latest years, the end of law firms or insurance companies does not seem 
near. This supports Markides‟ view of long term co-existence with new innovative business 
models. Summarized the view of Markides (2006) and Christensen (2006) could imply that 
the HOC innovation would co-exist with similar services from law firms and traditional 
insurance companies for a long time, but as new markets are created by innovative business 
models the existing business model will become more and more marginalized. 
The new market that HOC insurance has created has contributed to a certain marginalizing of 
law firms, which began with corporations‟ in-sourcing of legal services by creating their own 
in-house legal departments several decades ago. In the prolongation of HOC insurance there 
has been established other insurance schemes with similar potential. The home buyer 
insurance is established as a preferred choice for 30% of home buyers since 2006, and legal 
consumer insurance schemes are viable in Norway. Other business models, not only insurance 
related, are expected to continue this trend. 
From the results and conclusion, some managerial insights and recommendations can be 
derived. Both related to further disruption of legal businesses, but also in regard to the 
applicability of the innovation theory framework on the future of the legal industry (and 
similar industries). 
 
5.2 Implications 
This thesis have been based on a review of literature on the theory of disruptive innovation, a 
study of cases in Norwegian courts and the emerging industry of HOC insurance companies 
in Norway. The analysis and conclusion strongly advice the management of legal businesses, 
that want to maximize shareholder value, to apply disruptive innovation theory on their 
businesses.  
In the years after the introduction of HOC insurance in 1996/97, the new product was subject 
to massive negative publicity. This was one of the reasons that the former market leader Ace 
Insurance decided to exit the market in 2004. Today one can observe the same negative 
critique against the home seller insurance that was introduced in 2006. This is another type of 
insurance, where the home seller is only insured against the legal expenses for pursuing the 
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claim and not against the costs associated to cure the defect. Diverging product properties and 
incentives for customers mean that the buyer insurance is not a direct analogy to the HOC 
insurance. Even though, it seems like this is a popular product among home buyers. Today 
around 1 of 3 home buyers purchases this type of insurance. The market leader in this 
segment, Help Forsikring, handles most of the cases with its own staff and uses its internal 
lawyers in court. This indicates that this type of insurance can be disruptive to law firms 
within the niche of representing home buyers in the same way as HOC insurance is disruptive 
within the niche of handling claims on behalf of home seller. This could be a partly 
substitution that stabilizes after some time as proposed by some scholars (Markides, 2006; 
Schmidt & Druehl, 2008), or it could be the first step to push law firms out of another niche in 
the same way as the HOC insurance did with the seller insurance (Christensen, 2006).  Time 
will show if the degree of disruption seen in HOC seller insurance can be replicated within 
buyer insurance, or legal insurance.  
Due to a strong legal profession and the conflicting nature of legal work, innovations within 
law can be vulnerable to critique both from lawyers and the public. Negative critique can be 
handled in different ways, for example to give up the innovation (like Ace Insurance) or 
continue to improve the product until it is “good enough” for most customers unaffected by 
the criticism (like AmTrust/NCL). One of the characteristics of disruptive innovations is that 
they initially are “not good enough” for most customers. This means that innovators within 
the legal sector to a greater extent than in other industries have to be prepared for critique and 
negative publicity, as they initially are not good enough for the general public, which are 
whom legislators and the legal profession care for. The traditional point of view that promotes 
a strongly regulated and “expensive” legal industry has a strong position in public in general 
and especially within the legal profession. It also means that new products within legal service 
providing not only have to be “good enough” to customers, but also “good enough” to 
convince legislators and the public that their basic considerations are taken care of. In practice 
this can mean to “keep under the radar” until your product has shown to be a too big success 
(for the average consumer) so that legislators cannot shut you down. This seems to be the case 
for both the HOC seller insurance, and now lately the HOC buyer insurance in Norway, which 
has been under heavy fire from some lawyers and also under supervision of the authorities, 
but still is offered with great success. 
The fact that HOC insurance has triggered a new market means increased revenue for some 
companies or industries. Even though several authors predict the end of the traditional law 
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firm (Christensen et al., 2013; Susskind, 2010, 2013), the remaining law firms still have the 
opportunity to position themselves to profit from where the future revenue will be created. As 
mentioned above this will likely not be created in the same operation as one chases the 
existing high margin customers. Through the lessons from HOC insurance, legal providers 
that wish to grow and increase their profit, should try to spot the new markets, of which there 
are many. If they are a traditional law firm, they also need a strategy to cope with the 
structural traditions in the law firm. From the literature discussed in this thesis Christensen 
and Markides offer strategic guidance on this topic. It is also possible to draw on the literature 
on structural ambidexterity. 
Lawyers have always built new practice areas, following new regulations, industry change 
etc. In the case of HOC insurance, law firms first built a substantial business on the basis of 
such claims, before the HOC companies gradually took over the niche. In the future new legal 
providers may be even more aggressive facing the introduction of new regulations, for 
example launching a new product already at, or before, the time of introduction. On the other 
hand it is advisable for legal businesses to consider the introduction of new regulations as 
opportunities to introduce new disruptive business models within a niche of legal work. 
Legal professionals/lawyers will likely not go out of business because of the industry changes 
examined in this thesis, but they will have to adapt to the industry changes. Through the 
changes examined in this thesis several lawyers and trained legal staff will meet the future in 
a previous unusual type of work-organization for legal professionals, for example with the 
HOC insurance companies and claim handlers. Legal professionals should be prepared for a 
similar development within other legal areas. 
The history of Norwegian Claims Link, which for all practical purposes could have been a 
department within one of the bigger Norwegian law firms, illustrates an attitude that might be 
more consistent with the traditional law firm partner model. This suggests that the business 
model of NCL/Norwegian Broker is as profitable for the partners/equity owners as the law 
firm pyramid is for most of today‟s law firm partners. The company was started by a set of 
partners that wanted to capture a future market, but without being an insurance company or a 
law firm. As a parallel to the traditional law firm, the partners work with sales and product 
development, while senior and junior associates do the claims handling.  
As a thought experiment, one could imagine that law firms had directed HOC insurance the 
same way as NCL/Norwegian Broker. The niche of handling claims on an hourly billed basis 
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would still have been, as it is today, totally disrupted by HOC insurance, but law firms would 
have succeeded in capturing 50% of the claims handling legal work created by HOC 
insurance, thus making this a sustaining innovation for their existing business model. This can 
be related to the much debated example on on-line stock brokerage, that is sustaining relative 
to the business models of discount brokers, because it can help them discount even more 
(respond to the innovation by making it sustaining to themselves, if not it would have been 
disruptive to them too), and disruptive relative to traditional brokers (if they can‟t make it 
sustaining in relation to their business model) (Christensen, 2006). The question is if the 
remaining law firms will eventually succeed in responding adequately to disruptive 
innovations. 
As NCL did with HOC insurance, future legal businesses have potential in the same way to 
integrate into products sold in other, or new, industries. What NCL did was to combine a 
market related unit with an isolated legal unit, and then work together with service/product 
providers to fill the gap between. This encourages law firms to go from problem solving to 
value creating. This could also do the marketing of legal services more easy, they would go 
from offering to solve problems that aren‟t there yet, to offering future revenue with the law 
firm providing much of the work. Of course the law firm would claim a big portion of this, 
but hopefully not so much that the partner goes away, like Protector did shortly after 
partnering with NCL/NB. Lawyers should be used to position their clients in favorable 
settings, so to position their law firms and their partners in a profitable setting should be a 
possible task, even without hiring marketers. 
For insiders of the legal industry it may sound logic to interpret disruptive innovation as 
something that begins with the smallest clients. For lawyers this will typically appear to be the 
smallest cases, often consumers, with the smallest sums involved. Disruptive innovation 
theory was traditionally built on empirical studies of physical products, which were typically 
sold at the same price to all customers. These dynamics may differ from what is seen in 
industries as for example the legal or consulting industries. It is characteristic for lawyers‟ 
(and similar profession‟s) services that even though the product is the same, for example 
representation in court, the price will vary depending on how big sums are involved. In other 
words a lawyer‟s services are scalable. Lawyers, or consultants, can do the same amount of 
work to a higher hourly price for wealthier clients than for poor clients. Larger sums involved 
also justifies to bill more hours. The pricing of HOC insurance is also scalable. The price is 
often a percentage of the property, typically between 0.3 and 0.5%. This means that the 
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pricing mechanisms in this type of markets may differ from what seen in markets for more 
conventional products. 
In regard to advice from scholars to watch the least demanding customers, legal businesses 
that want to succeed with disruptive innovation should not only keep an eye on the smaller 
consumer or business clients. They should also watch closely all new innovations that direct 
established or new legal niches, and regard industry boundaries as something floating rather 
than an obstacle. Once an entrant has got a foothold within a in a niche of legal work, a 
traditional law firm is forced upwards the performance trajectory, which for law firms means 
to merge with other law firms. 
The fact that HOC insurance also is sold to sellers of high priced houses indicates that the 
HOC insurance is not a phenomenon reserved for the average consumer. This can be a useful 
thought for law-firms choosing to concentrate on higher-margin work, typically work for 
business clients. If disruptive innovations are developed within other legal niches it is, as the 
experience with HOC insurance show, not unthinkable that new innovative business models 
also will overtake the most profitable customers within each niche. To better understand the 
industry changes and the causal mechanisms more research should be done on the substitution 
process for this type of services. 
This study was based on a review of the literature on disruptive innovation theory, and a study 
of cases in Norwegian courts. This, of course, sets some limits for the reach and applicability 
of the results and conclusion.  The dataset is gathered from public available legal records, 
where the available data samples may be in different form or detail. Some of the examined 
legal records did not contain information about the price of the home price, and were 
therefore not included in the analysis of average prices and price segments. As mentioned the 
legal record is also anticipated to only show the “tip of the iceberg” of the market for HOC 
insurance and law firms, and this sets limitations for the applicability and conclusion drawn. 
On the other hand the study has thrown light on a remarkable structural change within one 
niche in the legal industry. 
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7 Appendices 
7.1 Appendix A: Recorded data from Oslo Tingrett 
 
1993 
    Reference HOC Insurance Company Judgement Property price 
91-08301 A-34 
 
10700 450000 
92-00019 A/41 
 
150000 540000 
91-08664 A/33 
 
75000 1500000 
92-07949 A/13 
 
19949 370000 
92-04807 A/27 
 
190000 1100000 
92-01627 A/69 
 
0 1850000 
92-707 A/14 
 
0 610000 
90-00880 A/74 
 
215000 2100000 
92-9213 A/17 
 
0 1000000 
90-00880 A/74 
 
215000 2100000 
92-09940 A/69 
 
50000 480000 
    1994 
    Reference HOC Insurance Company Judgement Property price 
93-07520 A/93 
 
15000 
 93-09529 A/61 
 
0 350000 
93-01495 A/52 
  
3850000 
93-05534 A/30 
 
0 
 98435-93 
 
0 1580000 
93-3788 A/21 
  
1625000 
    1995 
    Reference HOC Insurance Company Judgement Property price 
94-2979 A/51 
 
4500 1340000 
94-8161 A/48 
 
49559 2300000 
94-03069 A/29 
 
0 900000 
94-00840 A/63 
 
27500 2125000 
94-06617 A/40 
 
50000 390000 
94-00473 A/41 
 
0 460000 
94-06553 A/45 
 
0 3000000 
94-04413 A/30 
 
17000 
 94-5490 A/73 
 
50000 2400000 
94-08614 A/18 
 
65000 1550000 
95-01787 A/26 
 
0 1050000 
95-02829 A/64 
 
20000 2550000 
57 
 
95-01277 A/12 
 
38385 
 95-01278 A/33 
 
129370 1040000 
93-02190 A/32 
 
100000 3425000 
95-03068 A/10 
 
22009 960000 
95-01099 A/54 
 
28255 925000 
    1996 
    Reference HOC Insurance Company Judgement Property price 
95-02705 A/36 
 
83179 
 95-02493 A/18 
 
18450 322000 
95-05456 A/28 
  
1000000 
94-08075 A/52 
 
0 525000 
95-00993 A/11 
 
0 670000 
96-00399 A/13 
 
0 
 96-02509 A/52 
 
2230 1310000 
95-09768 A/31 
 
125000 1550000 
96-5204 A/62 
 
100000 1975000 
    1997 
    Reference HOC Insurance Company Judgement Property price 
95-09052 A/78 
 
9000 1405000 
96-01525 A/55 
 
0 1150000 
96-9769 A/78 
 
18204 
 95-8349 A/63 
 
109996 2200000 
96-04562 A/76 
 
100000 
 96-04641 A/46 
 
62400 1175000 
96-04921 A/30 
 
0 1410000 
96-02653 A/23 
 
0 2275000 
96-06294 A/46 
 
0 2100000 
96-06354 A/46 
 
38175 1174000 
96-6850 A/73 
 
10440 1800000 
96-08846 A/27 
 
10000 2100000 
96-07851 A/33 
 
30000 305000 
96-02507 A/76 
 
10000 
 96-95759 
 
165000 2400000 
9602675 A/47 
 
200000 1050000 
97-01392 A/83 
 
20000 3700000 
97-07340 A/82 
 
30000 900000 
96-09894 A/57 
 
50851 980000 
97-02129 A/82 
 
39500 1320000 
97-00388 A/33 
 
197755 2300000 
96-05026 A/18 
 
0 
 
    1998 
58 
 
    Reference HOC Insurance Company Judgement Property price 
97-06963 A/25 
 
45000 2600000 
97-04821 A/68 
 
32000 1630000 
96-08555 A/30 
   97-04515 A/47 
 
38500 505000 
96-09392 A/83 
 
0 510000 
97-06800 A/57 
 
0 1100000 
97-00381 A/54 
 
125000 870000 
96-10193 A/87 
 
100000 2150000 
97-07041 A/80 
 
25000 2335000 
96-09544 A/21 
 
0 2700000 
97-7711 A/68 
 
100000 1700000 
97-5563 A/74 
 
0 320000 
97-5627 A/23 
 
0 4800000 
98-00188 A/12 
 
15000 1845757 
97-7799 A/34 
 
90000 2125000 
97-3600 A/74 
 
235000 2400000 
98-00590 A/36 
 
60244 
 98-333 A/87 
 
0 410000 
98-02399 A/75 
 
10223 550000 
98-4216 A/34 
 
48500 1650000 
97-04741 A/86 
 
54500 1050000 
98-4834 A/42 
  
1150000 
98-923 A/72 
 
89741 1705000 
97-09133 A/78 
 
50000 1120000 
98-01616 A/71 
 
48627 805000 
    1999 
    Reference HOC Insurance Company Judgement Property price 
98-07331 A/10 
 
0 3500000 
97-3260 A/73 
 
142152 1700000 
98-00416 A/69 
 
35000 510000 
97-08946 A/23 
 
0 3275000 
98-3045 A/87 
 
0 1335000 
98-09920 A/36 
 
14365 
 98-1851 A/10 
 
0 1560000 
98-05828 A/50 
 
47125 1200000 
98-05881 A/22 
 
0 720000 
98-8250 A/47 
  
1600000 
98-05763 A/46 
 
91832 1255000 
98-07551 A/31 
 
30000 
 98-00706 A/24 
 
0 2000000 
98-08961 A/50 
 
0 885000 
98-11560 A/57 
 
20000 1865000 
59 
 
98-05800 A/47 
 
75000 460000 
99-03777 A/34 
 
17538 420000 
98-10391 A/46 
 
0 430000 
98-11526 A/84 
 
70000 687995 
98-11375 A/37 
 
70000 
 97-03989 A/74 
 
96628 2825000 
98-6110 A/60 
  
1820000 
98-5323 A/20 
 
45000 1700000 
98-11211 A/15 
 
350000 
 98-10621 A/27 
 
250000 1935000 
98-8882 A/72 
 
140000 655000 
98-11444 A/74 
 
30000 1570000 
98-06801 A/51 
 
26405 400000 
99-00220 A/85 
 
0 1785000 
98-09424 A/76 
 
0 800000 
    2000 
    Reference HOC Insurance Company Judgement Property price 
00-08578 A/83 
 
125000 1275000 
98-11193 A/34 
 
290000 2435000 
99-00689 A/78 
 
30000 365000 
99-00472 A/33 
 
275000 2460000 
99-11504 A/82 
 
50000 970000 
99-6267 A/25 
 
30000 510000 
99-4513 A/47 
 
58758 4250000 
99-07516 A/33 
 
80218 6000000 
99-08373 A/11 
 
0 2900000 
99-04525 A/80 
 
890000 2460000 
99-8029 A/79 
 
0 1720000 
99-11229 A/34 
 
0 550000 
99-9709 A/82 
 
40000 39750000 
98-04623 A/17 
 
175000 1500000 
99-05542 A/17 
 
100000 1630000 
00-02015 A/51 
 
95550 1600000 
99-00662 A/33 
 
0 960000 
98-05897 A/28 
 
140000 3015000 
99-06071 A/32 
 
40000 875000 
99-11594 A/46 
 
0 2822000 
98-04772 A/63 
 
50000 2150000 
99-6670 A/36 
 
50000 875000 
99-5529 A/36 
 
0 915000 
99-07056 A/71 
 
20000 740000 
99-10089 A/16 
 
0 2000000 
99-10455 A/36 
 
0 1460000 
99-04103 A/54 
 
0 635000 
60 
 
99-09019 A/20 
 
60000 465000 
99-1001 A/82 
 
11900 410000 
99-05450 A/92 
 
20605 2500000 
00-03335 A/66 
 
0 1175000 
99-09196 A/10 
 
0 2450000 
99-05032 A/34 
 
113352 2300000 
99-04605 A/15 
 
180000 1675000 
99-6571 A/68 
 
200000 2250000 
99-11708 A/88 
 
74015 1500000 
99-5717  A/12 
 
100000 1710000 
99-08661 A/76 
 
80000 2400000 
99-11734 A/11 
 
0 1090000 
99-10307 A/79 
 
50000 2600000 
99-11055 A/77 
 
35000 460000 
00-00734 A/18 
 
0 3600000 
00-02687 A/60 
 
250000 2900000 
99-10509 A/57 
 
110670 9500000 
00-01925 A/66 
 
130000 985000 
00-7858 A/83 
 
0 1170000 
    2001 
    Reference HOC Insurance Company Judgement Property price 
00-02038 A/43 
 
0 455000 
00-08587 A/83 
 
125000 1275000 
00-02744 A/84 
 
45000 280000 
00-044459 A/48 Ace 74000 1030000 
00-00973 A/93 
 
17000 5600000 
99-09585 A/34 
 
0 1300000 
00-03699 A/46 
 
0 1400000 
00-02680 A/67 
 
12500 1727000 
99-01922 A/52 
 
65000 1370000 
00-4999 A/62 
 
0 4100000 
00-6983 A/90 
 
0 3750000 
00-04558 A/80 
 
389684 750000 
00-02490 A/60 
 
0 1500000 
00-0114 A/79 Vesta Forsikring AS 19900 2200000 
00-4946 A/42 
 
0 2180000 
99-11196 A/67 
 
154409 920000 
99-10760 A/44 
 
0 1650000 
00-03734 A/22 
 
1735000 5500000 
00-09261 A/53 Ace 0 1400000 
00-1441 A/38 
 
40000 960000 
00-6350 A/42 
 
0 500000 
00-7683 A/25 
 
13000 2600000 
01-04106 A/51 
 
100000 
 
61 
 
00-1867 A/95 Tennant Forsikring 0 2200000 
00-06781 A/27 
 
0 2250000 
00-10909 A/87 Ace 0 1320000 
00-06069 A/67  Tennant Forsikring AS 372441 4300000 
00-06708 A/66 
 
37600 815000 
99-10100 A/91 
 
0 1650000 
00-7881 A/60 
 
0 300000 
00-09845 A/44 
 
70000 650000 
00-4215 A/26 
 
0 835000 
01-4551 A/33 Norwegian Claims Link AS 40000 1930000 
00-05866 A/66 
 
122607 1925000 
00-10102 A/86 
 
154107 1150000 
00-10227 A/84 
 
0 1160000 
00-7090 A/74 
 
104165 900000 
00-05345 A/51 
 
150000 1010000 
01-00444 A/84 
 
50000 1000000 
01-02557 A/87 
 
150000 9000000 
00-09136 A/17 
 
1450000 14500000 
00-00683 A/56 
 
0 6000000 
00-01124 A/36 Ace 
  
    2002 
    Reference HOC Insurance Company Judgement Property price 
01-01169 A/40 
 
15000 1620000 
00-10603 A/66 IF 115727 1950000 
01-01442 A/64 
 
36000 1500000 
00-11141 A/64 Vesta Forsikring AS 200000 2250000 
01-9344 A/27 
 
0 2650000 
00-5554 A/38 
 
97551 3950000 
01-2110 A/61 Ace 175000 1290000 
01-06277 A/48 
 
0 2720000 
01-05230 A/87 
 
300000 3100000 
01-06082 A/52 
 
92160 1930000 
01-09099 A/36 
 
64600 540000 
01-10764 A/50 Ace 0 1900000 
01-4389 A/62 
Reliance National Insurance 
Company (Europe) Ltd v/ 
Tennant Forsikring AS. 0 3100000 
01-02637 A/87 
 
441098 48000000 
02-01883 A/17 
 
30750 1120000 
01-07533 A/83 Vesta Forsikring AS 70000 2455000 
01-01077 A/46 
 
0 1100000 
02-00655 A/74 Norwegian Claims Link AS 11235 2850000 
01-05021 A/55 
 
74400 2900000 
01-06902 A/98 
 
0 600000 
62 
 
01-04858 A/68 
 
625000 7750000 
01-09872 A/22 
 
0 2050000 
01-11069 A/32 
 
4887 1950000 
01-10911 A/68 
 
27200 780000 
00-10704 A/23 
 
100000 1330000 
01-05794 A/73 
 
20000 1225000 
01-09428 A/51 
 
30000 2300000 
01-7175 A/78 Ace 0 2400000 
02-01269 A/64 
 
0 7000000 
02-02517 A/83 
 
27300 1800000 
01-04658 A/45 
 
5000 1200000 
01-10462 A/31 
 
10000 4800000 
01-05434 A/40 
 
140000 2275000 
02-1809 A/38 Ace 0 1430000 
01-12112 A/42 Ace 110000 1900000 
01-11058 A/68 Ace 21899 3150000 
01-09158 A/59 Ace 35000 2750000 
02-04243 A/50 
 
0 915000 
02-6531 A/32 Ace 0 6800000 
01-10291 A/57 Tennant Forsikring AS 48750 1800000 
02-595 A/94 Ace 0 1350000 
01-11291 A/48 
Reliance National Insurance 
Company (Europe) Ltd 225000 4150000 
01-03912 A/15 
 
500000 24250000 
    2003 
    Reference HOC Insurance Company Judgement Property price 
02-02677 A/91 
 
0 2950000 
00-05400 A/88 
 
150000 2420000 
02-01937 A/45 
 
65000 
 02-00155 A/32 
 
0 
 02-10554 A/16 
 
0 1400000 
01-9506 A/68 Ace 0 1260000 
02-02861 A/24 Vesta 100000 4100000 
01-7152 A/52 Tennant Forsikring 650000 2650000 
02-07595 A/11 Ace 70207 2250000 
02-01812 A/91 
 
90000 800000 
01-01860 A/04 
Reliance National Insurance 
Company (Europe) Ltd. 
V/Tennant Forsikring AS 115208 3300000 
02-01607 A/13 Ace 200000 3000000 
01-11144 A/96 
 
0 1250000 
02-1195 A/42 
 
50000 850000 
02-02348 A/93 
 
68000 3700000 
02-02963 A/11 
Reliance National Insurance 
Company (Europe) Ltd. 0 2600000 
63 
 
V/Tennant Forsikring AS 
01-11261 A/20 Ace 150000 2670000 
01-07026 A/17 Ace 0 6000000 
02-06269 A/66 
 
300000 3600000 
02-01926 A/28 
 
400000 5600000 
02-12296 A/89 Ace 115000 2250000 
02-09327 A/36 
 
152400 1450000 
02-04912 A/16 
 
0 1200000 
02-3276 A/65 
 
0 750000 
01-06623 A/51 
 
0 2450000 
02-10329 A/62 Norwegian Claims Link AS 0 1050000 
02-4964 A/05 Ace 0 1200000 
02-7616 A/25 Tennant Forsikring AS 119409 1640000 
02-04006A/34 
 
719380 3850000 
02-5590 A/63 
Reliance National Insurance 
Company (Europe) Ltd. 
V/Tennant Forsikring AS 72000 3900000 
02-10536 A/56 
 
0 5600000 
02-12078 A/65 Ace 250000 2675000 
02-09746 A/52 ja 167515 1600000 
03-00020 A/32 
 
80000 1450000 
03-005020TVI-OTIR/03 
 
51139 1150000 
02-4950 A/47 
 
0 2600000 
02-2529 A/78 
 
0 2200000 
02-6907 A/73 Ace 0 3000000 
02-11288 A/65 
 
133000 3950000 
02-2528 A/52 
 
0 5500000 
03-005417TVI-OTIR/01 
 
0 1780000 
02-10267 A/94 
 
0 
 03-07263 A/73 
 
64424 
 
02-12502 A/79 
Reliance National Insurance 
Company (Europe) Ltd. 
V/Tennant Forsikring AS 743800 4800000 
03-004928TVI-OTIR/09 Ace 385000 2200000 
02-12069 A/65 
 
460680 4200000 
02-10058 A/24 Ace 200000 3900000 
02-11670 A/46 
Reliance National Insurance 
Company (Europe) Ltd. 
V/Tennant Forsikring AS 0 1550000 
03-006478TVI-OTIR/08 
 
50000 790000 
03-008098TVI-OTIR/06 
 
15000 2400000 
    2004 
    Reference HOC Insurance Company Judgement Property price 
03-006306TVI-OTIR/05 
 
0 3260000 
03-04102 A/45 Ace 200000 
 
64 
 
03-007050TVI-OTIR/07 
 
122400 1205000 
03-019376TVI-OTIR/05 
 
0 2300000 
03-00986 A/74 Gerling Norge As 253591 3750000 
03-014509TVI-OTIR/06 Ace 76935 3175000 
03-007020TVI-OTIR/08 
 
75000 1500000 
03-004858TVI-OTIR/05 
 
91993 2900000 
03-004819TVI-OTIR/07 
 
0 2900000 
03-015371TVI-OTIR/06 
 
100000 4800000 
03-020260TVI-OTIR/08 
Reliance National Insurance 
Co. (Europe) Ltd. 75000 2000000 
03-006996TVI-OTIR/09 Ace 90000 3600000 
03-006630TVI-OTIR/08 
 
55000 4590000 
03-004851TVI-OTIR/08 
 
0 2500000 
03-018497TVI-OTIR/04 
Reliance National Insurance 
Co. (Europe) Ltd. 95000 3300000 
03-008781TVI-OTIR/04 Ace 60000 4500000 
03-015215TVI-OTIR/02 
 
5535 3310000 
03-019187TVI-OTIR/06 
 
360000 2410000 
03-009660TVI-OTIR/03 Ace 1690000 4650000 
03-006568TVI-OTIR/06 
 
390000 6450000 
03-017221TVI-OTIR/08 
 
0 1970000 
04-016416TVI-OTIR/10 
   03-006146TVI-OTIR/01 Ace 693374 3360000 
04-006324TVI-OTIR/04 Gerling Norge As 128198 1950000 
03-008076TVI-OTIR/03 
 
87117 
 03-015951TVI-OTIR/09 
 
0 3300000 
03-004893TVI-OTIR/06 
 
0 2500000 
04-004338TVI-OTIR/10 Ace 296101 3300000 
03-007780TVI-OTIR/05 
 
20000 2425000 
04-000360TVI-OTIR/01 Ace 0 300000 
03-019178TVI-OTIR/09 IF Skadeforsikrin 0 3870000 
03-015964TVI-OTIR/09 Ace 150000 3250000 
04-007325TVI-OTIR/10 
 
0 
 04-050006TVI-OTIR/04 
 
100000 
 04-016562TVI-OTIR/10 Ace 100000 4000000 
03-006392TVI-OTIR/07 Ace 720000 720000 
04-023699Tvi-OTIR/10 Gerling Norge As 0 1700000 
04-025104TVI-OTIR/10 Anticimex 0 3975000 
03-007031TVI-OTIR/05 
 
48000 825000 
    2005 
    Reference HOC Insurance Company Judgement Property price 
04-056665TVI-OTIR/01 
 
32281 1650000 
04-090137TVI-OTIR/08 
 
60000 1150000 
03-007619TVI-OTIR/08 
 
400000 6600000 
04-017235TVI-OTIR/07 
 
0 7500000 
65 
 
04-032357TVI-OTIR/06 
 
100000 2800000 
04-096363TBI-OTIR/07 
 
0 4350000 
05-023636TVI-OTIR/02 Ace 20000 4900000 
04-031679TVI-OTIR/07 Ace 160000 3390000 
04-010923TVI-OTIR/05 
 
0 4000000 
04-055721TVI-OTIR/06 Ace 70000 1775000 
04-066266TVI-OTIR/07 
 
52326 1450000 
05-041965TVI-OTIR/02 
 
70000 1200000 
05-022101TVI-OTIR/69 
Reliance National Insurance 
Company (Europe) v/norsk 
representant Tennant AS 70400 1825000 
04-054251TVI-OTIR/07 Ace 250000 
 05-059811TVI-OTIR/09 
 
0 1790000 
04-095996TVI-
OTIR/06/69 
 
37170 4575000 
05-077256TVI-OTIR/04 Ace 0 2980000 
05-100902TVI-OTIR/04 
 
65500 6725000 
05-083094TVI-OTIR/01 
 
150000 1400000 
05-040094TVI-OTIR/06 
 
800000 2425000 
05-081281TVI-OTIR/04 Ace 70000 2730000 
04-082440TVI-OTIR/08 
 
215000 6500000 
05-070957TVI-OTIR/01 Ace 160000 3975000 
05-067002TVI-OTIR/03 Ace 120000 5000000 
    2006 
    Reference HOC Insurance Company Judgement Property price 
05-142283TVI-OTIR/05 Ace 0 3100000 
05-097658TVI-OTIR/01 
 
40000 1000000 
05-140583TVI-OTIR/08 Ace 125000 3400000 
05-167724TVI-OTIR/04 
 
90000 1250000 
05-144443TVI-OTIR/09 
 
228750 3350000 
05-099279TVI-OTIR/10 Protector 0 5490000 
05-186534TVI-OTIR/06 
 
100706 3250000 
06-036507TVI-OTIR/09 Ace 0 4900000 
06-008937TVI-OTIR/10 
Reliance National Insurance 
Company (Europe) Ltd 
v/Tennant Forsikring AS 0 2275000 
06-016771TVI-OTIR/01 Protector 80625 3650000 
05-080452TVI-OTIR/01 
 
245249 1425000 
06-018814TVI-OTIR/10 Protector 0 3450000 
05-119418TVI-OTIR/05 
 
0 1590000 
06-015401TVI-OTIR/10 Protector 0 1200000 
05-123001TVI-OTIR/05 Anticimex 51250 4835000 
06-019886TVI-OTIR/10 
 
0 925000 
06-048694TVI-OTIR/04 Protector 0 3250000 
03-014889TVI-OTIR/09 
 
192616 4650000 
66 
 
05-163416TVI-OTIR/06 
 
0 1130000 
05-064673TVI-OTIR/02 Ace 300000 2400000 
06-027958TVI-OTIR/10 
 
100000 
 04-014150TVI-OTIR/05 Ace 880000 3260000 
06-056707TVI-OTIR/06 
 
45000 2200000 
06-104533TVI-OTIR/02 
 
84281 3450000 
06-073551TVI-OTIR/06 Protector 122500 2450000 
06-035854TVI-OTIR/08 Ace 129411 1700000 
06-128930TVI-OTIR/04 
 
0 7200000 
06-102449TVI-OTIR/04 Protector 102105 1000000 
06-061881TVI-OTIR/10 
 
70000 2050000 
06-093111TVI-OTIR/03 Protector 85500 1700000 
06-070637TVI-OTIR/10 Ace 50000 
 05-185430TVI-OTIR/04 Protector 0 14400000 
06-071340TVI-OTIR/08 Ace 142596 910000 
06-087196TVI-OTIR/07 Protector 88000 880000 
06-125385TVI-OTIR/04 Ace 340000 4500000 
    2007 
    Reference HOC Insurance Company Judgement Property price 
06-130083TVI-OTIR/09 Protector 0 1900000 
06-118212TVI-OTIR/03 
 
0 2740000 
06-085811TVI-OTIR/03 
 
0 1300000 
06-092481TVI-OTIR/02 Protector 130000 1430000 
06-040417TVI-OTIR/02 
 
176550 4400000 
06-172568TVI-OTIR/01 
 
0 2975000 
06-185035TVI-OTIR/10 Protector 15000 2100000 
06-100668TVI-OTIR/01 Ace 40000 2830000 
07-016630TVI-OTIR/04 Protector 0 3150000 
06-188140TVI-OTIR/03 AmTrust 
 
2260000 
06-187419TVI-OTIR/05 AmTrust 0 
 06-141659TVI-OTIR/03 Ace ved Norwegian Claims Link 62484 
 07-010781TVI-OTIR/02 
 
500 1740000 
07-017355TVI-OTIR/06 
 
147985 1900000 
06-185600TVI-OTIR/01 
 
300000 3900000 
06-187478TVI-OTIR/05 
 
255000 2550000 
07-001475TVI-OTIR/05 Protector 3000 1300000 
07-040760TVI-OTIR/10 
 
164959 
 06-167886TVI-OTIR/10 
 
10000 1315000 
07-000247TVI-OTIR/06 Protector 300000 2350000 
06-035198TVI-OTIR/03 
 
105712 935000 
06-115857TVI-OTIR/02 
 
150000 2700000 
06-159335TVI-OTIR/10 
 
0 325000 
07-005217TVI-OTIR/10 
 
350000 3000000 
07-047529TVI-OTIR/03 Protector 28000 9200000 
67 
 
07-016551TVI-OTIR/03 
 
1000000 6500000 
07-070723TVI-OTIR/10 Protector 0 580000 
07-079645TVI-OTIR/04 Protector 90000 2250000 
06-131691TVI-OTIR/10 
 
18750 2325000 
06-131339TVI-OTIR/10 ACE 300000 2400000 
07-088163TVI-OTIR/08 AmTrust 15000 1325000 
07-104426TVI-OTIR/06 Protector 137530 1100000 
07-073231TVI-OTIR/08 Protector 0 6075000 
06-126621TVI-OTIR/08 Protector 92500 
 07-085785TVI-OTIR/10 Anticimex 121552 1100000 
07-077011TVI-OTIR/01 IF Skadeforsikring 424900 9250000 
07-111922TVI-OTIR/02 Protector 200000 3770000 
07-127304TVI-OTIR/05 AmTrust 0 5800000 
    2008 
    Reference HOC Insurance Company Judgement Property price 
07-133827TVI-OTIR/02 AmTrust 0 9500000 
07-090516TVI-OTIR/04 Protector 471250 11000000 
07-080775TVI-OTIR/08 AmTrust 98930 3600000 
07-141962TVI-OTIR/02 
 
718750 8450000 
07-139758TVI-OTIR/10 Protector 270887 6150000 
07-131241TVI-OTIR/02 
 
0 
 06-166439TVI-OTIR/03 Protector 
 
1510000 
07-100808TVI-OTIR/02 
 
315425 2400000 
07-114669TVI-OTIR/07 
 
0 1095000 
07-168319TVI-OTIR/01 AmTrust 38297 6830000 
08-150512TVI-OTIR/02 AmTrust 57640 2550000 
07-172099TVI-OTIR/02 Protector 762227 
 07-192720TVI-OTIR/06 
 
109250 700000 
07-138193TVI-OTIR/06 Protector 98813 3100000 
07-184213TVI-OTIR/10 Protector 200000 2370000 
08-067079TVI-OTIR/10 
 
0 900000 
07-149702TVI-OTIR/01 
 
15400 4200000 
07-178929TVI-OTIR/05 
 
558209 
 08-047932TVI-OTIR/10 Anticimex 210000 2425000 
08-087466TVI-OTIR/10 Protector 0 
 08-070034TVI-OTIR/07 
 
0 2250000 
07-179477TVI-OTIR/02 Protector 558000 
 08-042416TVI-OTIR/01 AmTrust 80000 1200000 
08-091640TVI-OTIR/10 AmTrust 0 1770000 
07-187156TVI-OTIR/05 Protector 1000000 1510000 
08-061447TVI-OTIR/10 
 
361950 5200000 
08-105996TVI-OTIR/04 Protector 0 1700000 
08-113426TVI-OTIR/07 Protector 0 4650000 
08-093327TVI-OTIR/01 ACE 75000 1550000 
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08-087555TVI-OTIR/10 
 
100000 2550000 
08-089042TVI-OTIR/06 AmTrust 410000 4790000 
    2009 
    Reference HOC Insurance Company Judgement Property price 
08-144110TVI-OTIR/08 AmTrust 134947 4500000 
08-151125TVI-OTIR/07 AmTrust 200000 4950000 
08-121725TVI-OTIR/08 
 
139353 3200000 
08-170486TVI-OTIR/05 
 
300000 8125000 
08-086551TVI-OTIR/06 Protector 297325 3260000 
08-184982TVI-OTIR/10 
 
278221 18750000 
09-02713TVI-OTIR/03 
 
22015100 3800000 
08-182737TVI-OTIR/04 
 
1493314 4950000 
08-188513TVI-OTIR/04 
  
1680000 
09-039039TVI-OTIR/06 Protector 30000 1950000 
08-043488TVI-OTIR 
 
495000 7600000 
09-110080TVI-OTIR/07 Protector 0 3000000 
09-132525TVI-OTIR/06 
 
0 1550000 
09-081605TVI-OTIR/07 
 
0 3175000 
09-042789TVI-OTIR/04 
 
140000 2765000 
08-194707TVI-OTIR/02 International Insurance Company of hannover Ltd 5200000 
09-119374TVI-OTIR/05 Protector 110500 1420000 
09-080060TVI-OTIR/04 
AmTrust ved Norwegian Claims 
Link 234000 3400000 
09-074941TVI-OTIR/01 
  
24000000 
09-052974TVI-OTIR/05 
  
4500000 
09-113350TVI-OTIR/05 
 
0 6550000 
09-159129TVI-OTIR/02 AmTrust 89239 
 09-043669TVI-OTIR/06 AmTrust/ 110063 4215000 
09-111377TVI-OTIR/10 Protector 0 2600000 
09-158408TVI-OTIR/04 AmTrust 32000 1980000 
09-109171TVI-OTIR/02 AmTrust 0 2400000 
    2010 
    Reference HOC Insurance Company Judgement Property price 
09-165725TVI-OTIR/10 Protector 0 3050000 
08-149223TVI-OTIR/10 Protector 240000 7300000 
09-160487TVI-OTIR/04 
 
0 2850000 
09-154774TVI-OTIR/10 
 
268000 
 09-109351TVI-OTIR/06 
 
0 2940000 
09-159164TVI-OTIR/06 AmTrust 0 5205525 
09-179026TVI-OTIR/01 
International Insurance 
Company of Hannover Ltd ved 
Norwegian Claims Link 0 2300000 
09-096296TVI-OTIR/05 Protector 650000 7000000 
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10-030018TVI-OTIR/10 AmTrust 0 3380000 
10-026974TVI-OTIR/02 AmTrust 222153 3825000 
10-037054TVI-OTIR/06 
 
0 1450000 
09-096949TVI-OTIR/08 
 
570825 10500000 
10-066819TVI-OTIR/04 Protector 0 1850000 
10-071832TVI-OTIR/08 
 
110000 600000 
10-006338TVI-OTIR/04 Protector 0 2260000 
10-028785TVI-OTIR/01 
 
0 1950000 
09-202775TVI-OTIR/01 Protector 1160000 3720000 
10-021687TVI-OTIR/10 
 
135800 1600000 
09-188082TVI-OTIR/01 Protector 0 3020000 
10-023584TVI-OTIR/05 
 
0 1600000 
10-077830TVI-OTIR/03 AmTrust 0 5025000 
10-032975TVI-OTIR/04 AmTrust 570000 7100000 
10-095753TVI-OTIR/02 AmTrust 0 3300000 
10-073310TVI-OTIR/02 AmTrust 250000 4925000 
10-094226TVI-OTIR/07 
 
75000 3160000 
10-089574TVI-OTIR/02 Protector 120000 3200000 
09-098499-OTIR/06 
 
0 9000000 
10-090166TVI-OTIR/03 
 
0 15000000 
10-063438TVI-OTIR/01 Protector 401500 
 
    2011 
    Reference HOC Insurance Company Judgement Property price 
10-051535TVI-OTIR/5 Protector 96000 1500000 
10-104401TVI-OTIR/01 Protector 896000 5900000 
10-082635TVI-OTIR/06 
 
97000 2750000 
10-180901TVI-OTIR/08 
 
190000 3300000 
10-095099TVI-OTIR/08 
 
0 12050000 
10-005868TVI-OTIR/06 
 
1000000 8500000 
10-201669TVI-OTIR/07 
 
60000 1170000 
10-195187TVI-OTIR/05 AmTrust 50000 4225000 
10-167486TVI-OTIR/08 Anticimex 73000 2850000 
10-191259TVI-OTIR/03 
 
150000 6350000 
11-035004TVI-OTIR/01 
 
0 1865000 
11-043498TVI-OTIR/07 Protector 95000 1800000 
11-024876TVI-OTIR/04 
 
394528 6350000 
11-024940TVI-OTIR/07 Protector 0 8150000 
11-011107TVI-OTIR/08 
 
100000 4745000 
11-056708TVI-OTIR/08 AmTrust 0 8200000 
11-026333TVI-OTIR/01 
 
0 25100000 
11-026463TVI-OTIR/02 
 
17000 1070000 
11-097774TVI-OTIR/07 
 
44306 
 11-033974TVI-OTIR/02 AmTrust 294000 4950000 
11-198358TVI-OTIR/05 Protector 500000 4150000 
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11-057589TVI-OTIR/08 Protector 0 1700000 
11-060620TVI-OTIR/07 
 
280000 2600000 
11-057590TVI-OTIR/06 Protector 40000 5400000 
11-117346TVI-OTIR/02 AmTrust 0 2290000 
11-059679-OTIR/04 AmTrust 0 2450000 
11-104082TVI-OTIR/05 Protector 0 
 
    2012 
    Reference HOC Insurance Company Judgement Property price 
11-156123TVI-OTIR/08 AmTrust 124000 8100000 
11-095913TVI-OTIR/03 AmTrust 190000 2720000 
11-131593TVI-OTIR/02 AmTrust 125000 8500000 
11-144930TVI-OTIR/03 AmTrust 130000 4290000 
11-100733TVI-OTIR/02 Protector 0 5800000 
11-208649TVI-OTIR/01 Protector 0 3475000 
11-169236TVI-OTIR/04 
 
0 3500000 
11-149054TVI-OTIR/05 Protector 270000 2878000 
11-191862TVI-OTIR/04 Protector 0 
 11-136968TVI-OTIR/04 Protector 350000 1360000 
11-141927TVI-OTIR/07 Protector 225000 3800000 
11-203235TVI-OTIR/02 Protector 0 2250000 
11-111390TVI-OTIR/05 
 
140000 4475000 
11-099163TVI-OTIR/05 Protector 0 19375000 
11-163408TVI-OTIR/04 
 
0 
 11-195634TVI-OTIR/02 
 
100000 5400000 
11-188167TVI-OTIR/08 Protector 0 5500000 
12-028075TVI-OTIR/04 
 
143743 4350000 
11-139848TVI-OTIR/06 Protector 120000 1080000 
12-023129TVI-OTIR/03 AmTrust 0 2380000 
11-189963TVI-OTIR/02 Protector 0 13959 
11-154516TVI-OTIR/03 Protector 947000 3700000 
11-198363TVI-OTUR/01 
 
0 4525000 
11-198531TVI-OTIR/03 Protector 440000 4300000 
12-056237TVI-OTIR/03 Protector 38063 3580000 
11-174680TVI-OTIR/06 AmTrust 0 1260000 
12-044016TVI-OTIR/03 Protector 0 2720000 
12-062982TVI-OTIR/02 Protector 0 2950000 
12-016310TVI-OTIR/07 
 
0 2150000 
11-204170TVI-OTIR/03 
 
0 3650000 
11-183347TVI-OTIR/06 
 
260000 1750000 
12-034506TVI-OTIR/06 
International insurance 
Company of Hannover Ltd(ved 
Norwegian Claims Link) 0 2200000 
12-080915TVI-OTIR/05 AmTrust 0 2375000 
12-132535TVI-OTIR/08 Protector 74000 5500000 
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12-105263TVI-OTIR/08 AmTrust 0 2350000 
12-125774TVI-OTIR/08 Protector 63710 1685000 
12-057202TVI-OTIR/01 
 
0 4175000 
12-163038TVI-OTIR/01 
 
40000 4150000 
12-065168TVI-OTIR/06 Protector 0 3720000 
    2013 
    Reference HOC Insurance Company Judgement Property price 
12-145931TVI-OTIR/02 
 
500000 9200000 
12-108815TVI-OTIR/03 Protector 240000 5750000 
12-152653TVI-OTIR/03 Protector 0 10500000 
12-190790TVI-OTIR/08 Protector 43122 100000 
12-207337TVI-OTIR/06 
International Insurance 
Company of Hannover Limited 80000 2250000 
12-162141TVI-OTIR/02 Protector 0 2900000 
12-151732TVI-OTIR/07 AmTrust 45625 3350000 
12-196044TVI-OTIR/02 Protector 0 3625000 
12-184504TVI-OTIR/05 AmTrust 508023 4250000 
12-208014TVI-OTIR/03 AmTrust 156178 
 12-176647TVI-OTIR/04 AmTrust 1270000 24000000 
13-031071TVI-OTIR/07 Protector 223500 
 12-198136TVI-OTIR/08 AmTrust 0 5600000 
12-188404TVI-OTIR702 AmTrust 434441 3550000 
12-185180TVI-OTIR/02 Protector 250000 2255000 
13-012926TVI-OTIR/01 AmTrust 0 8900000 
13-054197TVI-OTIR/03 
International Insurance 
Company of Hannover Limited 0 
 12-188651TVI-OTIR/08 Protector 52000 
 12-194350TVI-OTIR/02 AmTrust 0 2300000 
12-191221TVI-OTIR/03 Protector 0 4500000 
13-014589TVI-OTIR/05 Protector 0 5575000 
13-044686TVI-OTIR/08 AmTrust 0 6000000 
13-047706TVI-OTIR/08 Protector 22000 4925000 
13-024079TVI-OTIR/07 AmTrust 218225 5800000 
13-114599TVI-OTIR/06 Protector 0 1600000 
13-047938TVI-OTIR/03 Protector 350000 2420000 
 
 
 
 
7.2 Appendix B: Recorded data from the Norwegian courts of appeals 
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1995 
  Reference HOC Insurance Company 
LB-1995-2654 
 LB-1995-1254 
 LA-1995-716 
 LB-1995-2327 
 LG-1995-675 
 LH-1995-588 
 LF-1995-452 
 LG-1995-261 
 LF-1995-118 
 
  1996 
  Reference HOC Insurance Company 
LB-1996-1312 
 LG-1996-1920 
 LB-1996-1114 
 LB-1996-2477 
 LB-1996-1187 
 LA-1996-1443 
 LB-1996-578 
 LE-1996-596 
 LA-1996-530 
 LB-1996-811 
 LF-1996-715 
 LG-1996-292 
 LB-1996-570 
 LA-1996-85 
 LA-1996-562 
 LF-1996-390 
 LA-1996-28 
 
  1997 
  Reference HOC Insurance Company 
LF-1997-1036 
 LE-1997-540 
 LF-1997-816 
 LB-1997-1070 
 LB-1997-993 
 LG-1996-2029 
 LE-1997-772 
 LA-1997-235 
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LA-1997-159 
 LF-1997-498 
 LH-1997-553 
 LG-1997-133 
 LF-1997-202 
 
  1998 
  Reference HOC Insurance Company 
LB-1998-3412 
 LB-1998-1887 
 LA-1998-1230 
 LB-1999-839 
 LE-1998-814 
 LA-1998-1223 
 LA-1998-400 
 LB-1998-1645 
 LA-1998-1735 
 LA-1998-1251 
 LB-1998-1831 
 LE-1998-311 
 LB-1998-2312 
 LG-1998-673 
 LB-1998-1495 
 LH-1998-475 
 LB-1998-482 
 LF-1998-519 
 LB-1998-1336 
 
  1999 
  Reference HOC Insurance Company 
LB-1999-3615 
 LB-1999-2840 
 LH-1999-298 
 LB-1999-2230 
 LA-1999-1379 
 LB-1999-2363 
 LB-1999-1690 
 LG-1999-1585 
 LB-1999-1353 
 LA-1999-1790 
 LG-1999-1272 
 LB-1999-1257 
 LH-1999-532 
 LA-1999-1356 
 
74 
 
LB-1999-1345 
 LG-1999-434 
 LA-1999-1288 
 LG-1999-447 
 LG-1999-610 
 LB-1999-1911 
 LG-1999-470 
 LB-1999-926 
 LB-1999-2211 
 LA-1999-362 
 LB-1999-120 
 LB-1999-1486 
 LB-1999-1260 
 LF-1999-431 
 LB-1999-839 
 LF-1999-54 
 LF-1999-62 
 
  2000 
  Reference HOC Insurance Company 
LE-2000-958 
 LB-2000-2820 
 LB-2000-3557 
 LG-2000-698 
 LF-2000-812 
 LB-2000-2763 
 LE-2000-394 
 LB-2000-3067 
 LB-2000-1308 
 LA-2000-881 
 LB-2000-1453 
 LB-2000-2203 
 LG-2000-260 
 LA-2000-1300 
 LH-2000-654 
 LH-2000-652 
 LA-2000-672 
 LA-2000-1183 
 LH-2000-134 
 LB-2000-2423 
 LA-2000-333 
 LA-2000-783 
 LH-2000-220 
 LB-2000-792 
 LB-2000-504 
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LH-2000-148 
 LA-2000-254 
 LF-2000-381 
 LE-2000-74 
 
  2001 
  Reference HOC Insurance Company 
LB-2001-3713 
 LB-2001-3006 
 LE-2001-971 
 LG-2001-1783 
 LA-2001-1940 
 LA-2001-1645 
 LB-2001-3065 
 LB-2001-1996 
 LB-2001-3259 
 LA-2001-806 
 LB-2001-3682 
 LB-2001-3138 
 LB-2001-3430 
 LG-2001-797 
 LE-2001-264 
 LB-2001-1811 
 LG-2001-212 
 LB-2001-2270 
 LB-2001-2999 Ace 
LE-2001-653 Vesta 
LB-2001-956 
 LB-2001-2603 
 LA-2001-1257 
 LB-2001-696 
 LB-2001-1616 
 LE-2001-656 Ace 
LA-2001-531 
 LA-2001-808 
 LB-2001-1613 
 LB-2001-695 
 LB-2001-955 Gerling Norge 
LH-2001-228 Ace 
LF-2001-250 Reliance National 
LB-2001-237 
 LB-2001-4036 Ace 
  2002 
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  Reference HOC Insurance Company 
LB-2002-3694 
 LB-2002-4092 
 LB-2002-4124 Ace 
LB-2002-3510 
 LB-2002-3745  
 LF-2002-762-2 
 LB-2002-2522 
 LB-2002-3034 
 LB-2002-2828 
 LB-2002-2262 Ace 
LB-2002-2441 
 LA-2002-898 Reliance National 
LG-2002-264 
 LA-2002-464 
 LB-2002-899 Ace 
LH-2002-881 
 LB-2002-1224 Ace 
LB-2002-1139 
 LB-2002-709 
 LA-2002-445 
 LE-2002-362 
 LB-2002-77 
 
  2003 
  Reference HOC Insurance Company 
LA-2003-20383 
 LH-2003-13250 
 LG-2003-6946 
 LG-2003-4566 
 LG-2003-4274 
 LG-2003-3409 
 LE-2003-2293 
 LB-2003-997 
 LB-2003-86 Ace 
LB-2003-7893 
 LB-2003-13884 
 LB-2003-10224 
 LB-2003-10061 
 LA-2003-14517 
 LA-2003-14514 Ace 
LG-2003-6325 Ace 
LG-2003-20842 
 LB-2003-9074 
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LB-2003-8912 Ace 
  2004 
  Reference HOC Insurance Company 
LH-2004-29871 
 LG-2004-7878 
 LG-2004-54361 
 LG-2004-54246 
 LG-2004-44013 
 LG-2004-33776 
 LG-2004-303 
 LG-2004-28316 
 LG-2004-25868 
 LE-2004-39789 Ace 
LE-2004-32009 
 LE-2004-25266 Ace 
LB-2004-6385 
 LB-2004-55104 Ace 
LB-2004-26470 Ace 
LB-2004-25424 
 LA-2004-4819 
 LA-2004-13509 
 LA-2004-11465 
 LA-2004-100402 Ace 
LB-2004-70823 Ace 
LB-2004-55328 Ace 
LB-2004-36455 
 LB-2004-26373 
 
  2005 
  Reference HOC Insurance Company 
LA-2005-92451 
 LA-2005-117179 Ace 
LF-2005-123140 
 LE-2005-80501 
 LA-2005-77537 
 LA-2005-71209 
 LA-2005-84595 
 LF-2005-44667 Ace 
LB-2004-6385 
 LB-2005-124021 
 LE-2005-165841 
 LB-2005-42682 
 LG-2005-131017 Ace 
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LB-2005-79059 Ace 
LB-2005-90635 
 LG-2005-131106 
 LA-2005-176497 
 LB-2005-48518 Ace 
LH-2005-144551 Ace 
LH-2005-181850 
 LG-2005-66135 
 LB-2005-5579 
 
  2006 
  Reference HOC Insurance Company 
LB-2006-168313 
 LG-2006-113217 Ace 
B-2006-65201 
 LB-2006-84123 Ace 
LB-2006-75433 Protector 
LG-2006-131129-
1 
 LE-2006-180041 
 LA-2006-121555 Ace 
LA-2006-105609 Ace 
LF-2006-165950 
 LB-2006-10537 
 LB-2006-4142 
 LG-2006-82660 Ace 
LA-2006-94709 
 LB-2006-1669 
 LF-2006-89610 
 LG-2006-49897 Ace 
LH-2006-103850 
 LE-2005-165841 
 LA-2006-76611 
 LG-2006-14565 Anticimex 
LE-2006-132294 Ace 
LH-2006-13671 Anticimex 
LF-2006-19733 
 LH-2006-8832 
 LB-2006-92759 
 LA-2006-86761 
 LF-2006-22175 
 LF-2006-41460 
 
  2007 
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Reference HOC Insurance Company 
LB-2007-177043 
 LB-2007-186809 Protector 
LB-2007-17193 Protector 
LA-2007-193507 
 LA-2007-149363 Protector 
LA-2007-98921 
 LB-2007-161499 
 LF-2007-179233 Protector 
LB-2007-167772 Protector 
LH-2007-188096 Protector 
LB-2007-104962 
 LA-2007-191511 Protector 
LH-2007-172083 
 LB-2007-18683 
 LB-2007-33439 Ace 
LG-2007-147165 Protector 
LB-2007-122535 
 LG-2007-104447 Ace 
LB-2007-4704 
 LB-2007-110904 
 LB-2007-120680 Protector 
LG-2007-82454 Protector 
LB-2007-25380 Protector 
LH-2007-150901 Protector 
LB-2007-58249 Protector 
LB-2007-71117 
 LF-2007-161099 
 LE-2007-136645 Protector 
LE-2007-122461 
 LF-2007-106310 Protector 
LB-2007-80930 
 LE-2007-110296 
 LA-2007-95989 Protector 
LF-2007-120880 Protector 
LE-2007-71031 
 LH-2007-54174 Protector 
LB-2007-29517 Protector 
LH-2007-28390 
 LH-2007-28395 
 LH-2007-46126 Protector 
  2008 
  Reference HOC Insurance Company 
LG-2008-52488 Ace 
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LB-2008-66532 AmTrust 
LB-2008-52299 Protector 
LE-2008-68252 
 LB-2008-82516 Protector 
LB-2008-35554 
 LA-2008-24736 
 LF-2008-71008 
 LB-2008-56156 
 LB-2008-16045 Protector 
LA-2008-74569 Anticimex 
LH-2008-55189 
 LB-2008-53496 Protector 
LB-2008-42237 
 LE-2008-87053 
 LB-2008-410 Protector 
LA-2008-28825 Protector 
LB-2008-64162 Ace 
LB-2008-43692 Protector 
LG-2008-6483 Anticimex 
LF-2008-45135 Protector 
LA-2008-3975 Protector 
LF-2008-6708 Ace 
LG-2008-126684 
 LF-2008-144208-
2 
 LB-2008-109461-
2 
 LE-2009-16903 
 LB-2008-154668 
 LG-2008-133707 
 LB-2008-143915 Protector 
LB-2008-127544 
 LB-2008-3153 
 LG-2008-133674 Ace 
LB-2008-127734 
 LA-2008-163369 Protector 
LA-2008-128455 Ace 
LH-2008-126064 
 LA-2008-94529 Protector 
LB-2008-82320 Anticimex 
LA-2008-104863 AmTrust 
LB-2008-95064 
 LG-2008-75570 
 LB-2008-167616 
 LG-2008-64744 Protector 
  2009 
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  Reference HOC Insurance Company 
LG-2009-192332 
 LB-2009-156410 
 LH-2009-148745 
 LB-2009-177438 
 LA-2009-193589 Protector 
LB-2009-102360 AmTrust 
LA-2009-134903 
 LG-2009-111525 
 LA-2009-177115 
 LA-2009-150501 
 LB-2009-127970 Protector 
LG-2009-79428 Anticimex 
LB-2009-26827 Protector 
LA-2009-129468 Protector 
LA-2009-106623 AmTrust 
LG-2009-60681 AmTrust 
LB-2009-83588 Protector 
LA-2009-76163 
 LG-2009-56672 
 LH-2009-105785 Protector 
LG-2009-20208 Ace 
LG-2009-21338 AmTrust 
LF-2009-115248 Protector 
LB-2009-28420 Ace 
LG-2008-126684 
 LH-2009-101575 
 
LG-2009-25142 
International Insurance Company of Hannover 
Limti 
LB-2009-37912 
 LH-2009-94266 
 LA-2009-79194 AmTrust 
LB-2009-52875 
 LB-2009-38874 Protector 
LB-2009-2906 Protector 
  2010 
  Reference HOC Insurance Company 
LB-2010-202938 Protector 
LB-2010-156488 
 LB-2010-107247 AmTrust 
LE-2010-164396 AmTrust / Anticimex 
LA-2008-72460 Protector 
LB-2010-29304 
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LG-2010-157037 Anticimex 
LA-2010-168761 Protector 
LG-2010-73352 
 LB-2010-27040 
 LF-2010-158511 
 LF-2010-175646 AmTrust 
LG-2010-118262 Anticimex 
LH-2010-194714 
 LB-2010-160565 
 LF-2010-164679 
 LG-2010-110201 
 LE-2010-150837 Protector 
LH-2010-161853 AmTrust 
LB-2010-62706 
 LG-2010-81823 
 LB-2010-53470 
 LA-2010-151384 
 LE-2010-143426 AmTrust 
LA-2010-125043 AmTrust 
LF-2010-110746 Protector 
LA-2010-81021 Protector 
LA-2010-89879 
 LB-2010-13675 
 LG-2010-15474 
 LE-2010-64606 Protector 
LA-2010-55015 
 LA-2010-30618 AmTrust 
LH-2010-20891 AmTrust 
LA-2010-8282 Protector 
  2011 
  Reference HOC Insurance Company 
LB-2011-129231 Protector 
LB-2011-105198 Protector 
LB-2011-201999 Protector 
LB-2011-72679 
 LG-2011-170181 AmTrust 
LB-2011-60280 Protector 
LB-2011-46273 Protector 
LG-2011-94268 
 LF-2011-181816 
 LB-2011-31447 
 LA-2011-163489 AmTrust 
LE-2012-27971 Protector 
LB-2011-61224 Protector 
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LB-2011-27307 
 LG-2011-76705 
 LB-2011-23791 
 LB-2011-27117 AmTrust 
LF-2011-100994 Protector 
LB-2011-25147 Protector 
LF-2011-167266 Protector 
LE-2011-148872 
 LB-2011-41409 
 LH-2011-161205 Protector 
LF-2011-126996 Protector 
LG-2011-48963 
Protector 
LA-2011-136576 Protector 
LG-2011-14966 
 LA-2011-94988 
 LE-2011-69996 Protector 
LE-2011-27327 Protector 
LH-2011-78523 
 LB-2011-197722 Protector 
LB-2011-154200 
 LB-2011-170228 Ace 
  2012 
  Reference HOC Insurance Company 
LB-2011-129231 Protector 
LB-2011-105198 Protector 
LB-2011-201999 Protector 
LB-2011-72679 
 LG-2011-170181 AmTrust 
LB-2011-60280 Protector 
LB-2011-46273 Protector 
LG-2011-94268 
 LF-2011-181816 
 LB-2011-31447 
 LA-2011-163489 AmTrust 
LE-2012-27971 Protector 
LB-2011-61224 Protector 
LB-2011-27307 
 LG-2011-76705 
 LB-2011-23791 
 LB-2011-27117 AmTrust 
LF-2011-100994 Protector 
LB-2011-25147 Protector 
LF-2011-167266 Protector 
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LE-2011-148872 
 LB-2011-41409 
 LH-2011-161205 Protector 
LF-2011-126996 Protector 
LG-2011-48963 Protector 
LA-2011-136576 Protector 
LG-2011-14966 
 LA-2011-94988 
 LE-2011-69996 Protector 
LE-2011-27327 Protector 
LH-2011-78523 
 LB-2011-197722 Protector 
LB-2011-154200 
 LB-2011-170228 Ace 
 
